Strategic procurement programmes: Before and after

We're all familiar with the 'before and after' images which so often paint a picture that suggests 'after' is more attractive than 'before'. If only that were the case with strategic procurements.

After years of 'before' trumpeting the anticiapted aspirational success of the NHS National Programme for IT, a programme which appeared to be the offspring of political egotism, the first signs of faltering, and the cosmetics of a name change, now politicians want answers:

"There has to be a reckoning. We have to know how much money has been squandered and what could have been done instead."

"If the people letting the contract have made a catastrophic, gargantuan mistake then there is an opportunity cost. It is the taxpayer who has to fork out money for what should have been spent n services they need."

To me the NPfIT was clear who was leading and the governance structure to be used. But back in 2011 I asked what happened to the application of Gateway Reviews on the Programme. Of course MPs received NAO reports on the Programme's progress too - they were not ignorant of the risks.

So when the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee sit down looking for answers, I hope they start by considering their own role in oversight - didn't they have a responsibility to the electorate? They could ask about political pressure that that was exerted and if civil servants 'pushed back'? They could then ask about who was getting paid for Programme leadership, where, when and why it went wrong? Then they could get the detailed findings of the Gateway Reviews? Then look at the risk register, how it was reviewed and when and what actions were taken? Then they could look at similar debacles, of which there are many, forget the political rhetoric and posturing? Finally they must ensure an environment exists which ensures there are very real penalties in place for those who should have blown the whistle on this and similar programmes yet didn't - did they lack the knowledge or the spine?

Unfortunately the 'after' looks fairly ugly for this Programme but perhaps the Beast could spawn some Beauty's for the future.

Not a good day for IT procurement strategy news

Not a good day for public procurement IT stories: two embarassing stories.  One looks like a procurement risk management and strategy issue linked with implementing a policy, regardless of understanding the risks; the second, concerns procurement project leadership credibility.


The Financial Times suggests the the Cabinet Office strategy of moving from big IT companies may have compromised effective delivery, in that the consortium of SMEs used as a preferred strategy may have stretched capability and led to service failures. 'Shambolic' is the term used!  While there are calls for delaying further rollout until lessons are learnt, is it not obvious that a phased rollout should have started with small departments should have been managed by the client with a watchful eye. Equally, while I can understand the sentiment of the policy, why on earth were ministers not aware of the risks, or were they?

The second story, this time in The Times, concerns the allocation of responsoibility for the Met's 'Total Technology' modernisation programme. It appears that one of those responsible for managing the programme brings with him unfortunate baggage of a past IT failure which cost £15m. While Grant Thornton found the oversight of the failed project in Surrey was 'not fit for purpose' it seems Rowley, who is now leading 'Total Technology', doesn't recognise that as relating to his leadership. Failure to recognise the need to learn lessons isn't a good place to be in - Mr Rowley and the Met need to understand what went wrong at Surrey and how those lessons will be applied in the future. As it is, Rowley's ability to gain the confidence of the programme team may already have compromised success. It is not a good omen.

So some key messages:

1. A policy needs to be risk assessed and then implementation managed;
2. If the decision is made to pursue a policy and strategy which is high risk it is best have a phased implementation starting with lower risk areas;
3. Where a project has failed due to leadership which is 'not fit for purpose' understand the reasons behind that statement, acknowledge the failure if necessary, and be clear how the lessons learnt with be applied;
4. Do expect a failed leader to deliver better leadership on a bigger programme without ensuring a strong governance structure is in place.

You don't need an IT system for every ill

Over the last few weeks I made some suggestions on how the NHS could reduce procurement costs through minor changes in the use of existing IT. Let's remember that GPs are central to the government's reform of the health service. Even at present, as I understand it, every time I have a visit to the hospital my GP receives a notification of who, what, why, where and when - it helps the GP take a more holistic approach to the patient. it also generally seems to work.

We also know that the NHS has not had a particularly exemplar approach to introducing 'all singing and dancing IT systems' - indeed just over a year ago I discussed how this could be improved.

Today we learn of the proposal for another 'all singing and dancing NHS IT system' - this time it will be used to identify potential cases of child abuse - £8.6m has been allocated for the development of the software.

In keeping with last week's blogs on reducing costs I think this is another opportunity for reducing procurement costs:  'just say no' to this proposed system and use existing records. By this I mean retain central role of the GP in seeing records of all hospital interventions and let the GP identify potential areas of risk - allocate more GP time to consultations and then perhaps they will be able to review the data.

The new system aims at safeguarding children. But I suspect that the introduction of such a reporting system may well lead to those abusive parents taking the precaution of avoiding the spotlight by merely avoiding taking their children to A&E - the abusers have in the past appeared to be quite sophisticated in getting under the radar. If that were the case the children we aim to protect may actually receive appropriate medical care.

Either way, if this system is to go ahead please make sure that the relevant procurement decisions are transparent, including reporting of robust gateway reviews at every stage. That way at least we may ensure all options are considered, including better use of existing systems, and also that we don't learn of another failed system being blamed for a potentially flawed but good idea.

So in summary:

1. Explore all the options, including greater use of existing systems;
2. Consider the potential disbenefits;
3. Evaluate the risks;
4. Adopt an ethos of transparent procurement decision making;
5. Ensure robust use of gateway reviews.