Design & delivery of a compelling 'Stay In' public information leaflet without shooting client in the foot

Next week we are told every household in the UK will start to receive a copy of a public information leaflet setting out 'Why the Government believes that voting to remain in the European Union is the best decision for the UK'.  We are told the leaflet has cost £9m, including the cost of packaging and delivery (Production: £458,500; Print and delivery: £5.947m; Digital promotion and website: £2.894m).

The initiative is proving, unsurprisingly, to be politically toxic but there are interesting procurement issues too - so if I were the CPO asked to have handled this procurement exercise here's some of the questions I would have asked:

1. Have we processes in place to comply with the EU Regs?
2. I assume the business case has been agreed, risk assessed and approved?
3. Has the 'do nothing' option or leave to the 'Stay in' campaign been fully evaluated?
4. Do we let one contract for design, one for print, one for packaging, one for delivery, and one over-arching contract?
5. The budget is separate for 'production' and 'print and delivery', what do we mean by 'production' - is that 'design'?
6. The design appears to include every other page as a colour picture, given that this is primarily about 'facts' will the additional pages of print and costs directly associated with the pictures be justified?
7. Has an equality impact assessment been completed on the design?
8. Are those with special needs accommodated?
9. Is there any risk that the potential suppliers could subsequently prove to be an embarrassment to the initiative? 
10. Which elements of the work can be used to showcase UK businesses, SME's and the community sector?
11. Which elements of the work could be delivered by UK businesses, SME's and the community sector?
12. What quality of paper is required, would cheaper quality match our needs?
13. Given that this initiative is being led by the Environment Secretary, will the paper and inks used reflect our aspired environmental credentials?
14. What are the alternative avenues for distribution which can be subjected to an options appraisal, for example, do we use Royal Mail or its competitors, community sector, local government refuse collection operatives (some may say that would cut out the middle man for many householders and go straight to the bin)?;
15. Given the Government Digital Strategy, the target audiences, and the Environment Secretary leadership, would a 'soft copy' and making use of social media perhaps be worth exploring more before pursuing a print dominant route?
16. Will there be costs incurred if householders pursue a 'return to sender' protest and have they been factored in?
17. Are you sure this initiative is not something we may live to regret?

Almost echoing my suggestions for reducing the cost of organising the Queen's Birthday celebrations, a letter in today's Times must ring alarm bells for those concerned with stewardship of the public purse:

Sir, I doubt I am the only director of a creative agency who would be more than happy to design a 16-page glossy brochure, edit and proofread it, for less than one tenth of the £500,000 of taxpayers' money mentioned in your report.

EDEN PHILLIPS, CEO, Edenco Creative 

Up on Cloud 9 with the Reform report '(Back to) the Future of public procurement'

I wearily plodded through Reform's report 'Cloud 9: The future of public procurement'. To be honest I think the highlight for me was making me think why on earth Estonia and South Korea were identified as exemplary benchmarks. I was about to compare the respective structures of devolved government and range of responsibilities and what they buy with that of the UK, and even the baseline from which their savings were achieved. Thankfully I stopped.

Sadly, the Reform report really doesn't tell us anything we didn't already know, and have known for at least 20 years.  Yes, we have heard over and over again that skills need to be improved, the benefits of embracing eProcurement, the need for better use of procurement data, a better attitude towards risk, etc, etc.. I could see nothing new there I'm afraid.

Indeed if we go back to the evidence given three years ago, by the then chief honchos of Government Procurement, to the Public Administration Select Committee (you can see an example of my posts at that time here) the mantra used in that evidence was that all these panacea were "Work in Progress".

What the Reform report doesn't tell us, which may help, is how did Estonia and South Korea bring about the change, assuming they did, which seems so illusive to the reform of UK public procurement. Do they hold individuals accountable for the bringing about change as opposed to just accepting "It's a work in progress"?

It would certainly be interesting to hear how the Reform report is viewed by the PASC and whether it acts as a catalyst to review progress since their 2013 inquiry.

Have the NAO got it wrong on gifts & hospitality?

I read the National Audit Office report on the 'Investigation into the acceptance of gifts and hospitality' with interest but have to say I am mystified. While the EU and United Nations are against the receiving of gifts within a procurement context, the NAO appear to have come to a view that:

While barring UK officials from accepting gifts and hospitality is an option, it would run the risk of hampering the legitimate activities of the departments and officials, including engaging with stakeholders.

How could the refusal of a gift hamper (excuse the pun) business? I am also mystified at the lack of explicit recommendations.

Hospitality and gifts are only targeted at those who are likely to have influence over a decision, and there should be no 'ifs' or 'buts', they are offered to distort decision-making. Of course, the NAO have referred to avoiding perceived conflicts of interest - sorry perception of hampering business is unavoidable when gifts and hospitality are received in the procurement process.

Let's also remember that any gift or hospitality offered is not free from cost - that cost has to be recouped from somewhere and in all probability is an overhead cost included in all public sector contracts.

So what were the examples of gifts received:

These included: tickets to professional sports and cultural events, sometimes accompanied by a spouse and/or children; bottles of champagne; wine for a team’s Christmas lunch; iPads; Fortnum & Mason hamper, a painting valued at £300.

That list is of course constrained by the fact that the systems for recording gifts are not robust and not adhered to anyway.

I didn't pick up anything which specifically addressed staff involved in procurement, but let's remember that if they are MCIPS/FCIPS the CIPS Code of Conduct applies.

Regardless, I think the NAO have missed a mark on this one, a robust approach to the acceptance of gifts and hospitality is not just about the perception of conflicts of interest, it is about protecting staff from potential allegations of bribery and corruption - it should not only be a risk management issue but a health and safety issue too.

Strategic procurement programmes: Before and after

We're all familiar with the 'before and after' images which so often paint a picture that suggests 'after' is more attractive than 'before'. If only that were the case with strategic procurements.

After years of 'before' trumpeting the anticiapted aspirational success of the NHS National Programme for IT, a programme which appeared to be the offspring of political egotism, the first signs of faltering, and the cosmetics of a name change, now politicians want answers:

"There has to be a reckoning. We have to know how much money has been squandered and what could have been done instead."

"If the people letting the contract have made a catastrophic, gargantuan mistake then there is an opportunity cost. It is the taxpayer who has to fork out money for what should have been spent n services they need."

To me the NPfIT was clear who was leading and the governance structure to be used. But back in 2011 I asked what happened to the application of Gateway Reviews on the Programme. Of course MPs received NAO reports on the Programme's progress too - they were not ignorant of the risks.

So when the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee sit down looking for answers, I hope they start by considering their own role in oversight - didn't they have a responsibility to the electorate? They could ask about political pressure that that was exerted and if civil servants 'pushed back'? They could then ask about who was getting paid for Programme leadership, where, when and why it went wrong? Then they could get the detailed findings of the Gateway Reviews? Then look at the risk register, how it was reviewed and when and what actions were taken? Then they could look at similar debacles, of which there are many, forget the political rhetoric and posturing? Finally they must ensure an environment exists which ensures there are very real penalties in place for those who should have blown the whistle on this and similar programmes yet didn't - did they lack the knowledge or the spine?

Unfortunately the 'after' looks fairly ugly for this Programme but perhaps the Beast could spawn some Beauty's for the future.

Bad Pharma, data manipulation & procurement inquiries

Richard Bacon MP, a member of the Public Accounts Committee, gave a very good interview on the Today programme this morning. I have listened to Bacon during various PAC procurement related inquiries and have always been impressed - to me he grasps key procurement issues very quickly and provides excellent scrutiny and probing. 

Although he did make reference to the NHS being a monopoly buyer, his interview wasn't about procurement but the publication of clinical research, or more specifically, the problems of drug companies withholding information which doesn't suit their vested commercial interests. I discussed some of these issues in my review of Ben Goldacre's Bad Pharma. 

However, he made a number of comments which are particularly relevant to procurement, for example, stating that "The whole point of scientific research is that you take all the data ..." because cherry-picking and just using research which suits your vested interests distorts the truth and leads to false impressions. 

I would like PAC to reflect on that when they consider procurement evidence too.

A tale of two cities for CLG procurement inquiry: Sheffield & Sheffield

The CLG Inquiry into procurement rolled into Sheffield on the 18 November. This initially impressed me as it provided an opportunity to get out and feel the pulse on the ground. I say initially, as it transpired during the evidence that the Committee had pre-purchased tickets for the 3.47 train back to London and therefore couldn’t hear evidence after 3.25. Was such a guillotine a demonstration of good value for money?

Anyway, I would love to have shared the carriage with the Committee as they returned to London, and waited for the “What are we to make of all that?”

The objective of the sortie to Sheffield was “about trying to find out what is really happening on the ground, ..., what is going right, and what is going wrong”. What they heard were mixed messages about procurement in Sheffield; not local government in general, and not local government procurement in Sheffield but a ‘come all ye’ of anecdotes from questionable sources. For example:

• Single sourcing is leading to an item which would otherwise have cost £10 costing £20, yet no evidence to substantiate that claim was provided;
•  EU procurement rules require contracts over £250k to be advertised, yet my understanding is that the threshold for councils is actually £173,934;
•  Contracts under £20k can be awarded on the basis of three phone calls;
• “people, companies and organisations from outside the area seem to have a better opportunity of obtaining procurement contracts, mainly because they do not have any conflicts of interest or for some other reason.”

My suggestion to the Committee is, if you hear such heresy and factually flawed evidence, treat the informants other evidence with a large pinch of salt.

But the Committee are not blameless in this evidence session,

Strategic supplier management in UK government

On Sunday I discussed Premier Foods novel approach to strategic suppliers. Yesterday, the National Audit Office published a Memorandum to Parliament on Managing Government Suppliers - an interesting publication for anyone concerned with strategic procurement approaches, regardless of the sector you work in.

Margaret Hodge, Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, is clearly not happy with what the Memorandum has highlighted, nor that of its sister report on the role of major contractors. Both would have been of particular interest had their conclusions been fed into the PASC Inquiry on public procurement so it will be interesting to see 'what happens next?'

40 contractors have been identified as 'strategic' and collectively they consume 25% of the government's total spend. The suppliers are identified as strategic on the basis of extent and profile across central government and potential added value, but not necessarily spend or risk.

There still appears to be confusion on roles, responsibilities and accountabilities between spending departments and the Cabinet Office. That strikes me as something which needs to be addressed urgently as it could lead to suppliers playing one off against the other and causing gaps in strategic supplier management. At the present spending departments are the contracting bodies, yet both the departments and suppliers are subjected to Cabinet Office interference without accountability. Of course there's nothing unique about this and it's not a problem unique to the public sector either.

But then we also have the potential for dysfunctionalism with the Cabinet Office's focus on short-term savings while departments can be expected to have a wider view.

What drives local government procurement improvement?

I'm sure many of you have been eagerly awaiting the evidence sessions on local government procurement to the Communities and Local Government Select Committee. On Monday the Committee  had its first session of oral evidence which is now published.

I had previously highlighted what I felt may be worth exploring, but it doesn't really look as if either the  Committee or LGA have spent anytime learning from history and would rather listen to some suspect assertions.

A good starting point was the Committee trying to establish what drives procurement improvement? Sadly, the LGA spokesperson had to have that question broken down into bite-sized chunks before the Committee came to his rescue. Then we heard, what I consider to be absolute nonsense, that the electorate are driving change through the ballot box. Thankfully the Committee had enough sense to question that assertion too. Having interviewed hundreds of local government procurement stakeholders this was the first time I have ever heard anyone suggest there is something in a manifesto about local government procurement. It's all about campaigns and the X factor in one council it seems.

We heard that the LGA have been working on a national procurement strategy since 2006 - why so little progress? Well perhaps, and I quote, "I am not sure a national framework is terribly helpful". We may be in a better position to judge whether a national procurement strategy would be helpful if they considered the evidence of the impact of the first NPS - there were annual impact assessments completed, why weren't they drawn upon? There were also some academic papers and from memory a ODPM financed impact assessment.

Local government procurement - what goes around comes around

How many of you recall the 2001 Byatt Review of local government procurement  or the subsequent 2003 National Procurement Strategy for local government. The impact assessments suggested they were effective. Of course I'm biased - I spend many years within IDeA supporting the NPS.

Now we find the Communities and Local Government Select Committee of the House of Commons have issued a call for submission of evidence on the effectiveness of Local Government Procurement.  The areas they hope to explore have a touch of deja vu echoing Byatt and the NPS which were a decade ago, yet I honestly wonder if those involved in the inquiry are aware of those antecedents.

I find it amazing that having dismantled almost the whole local government procurement support structure someone has now decided to find out what's going on. But I suppose if you think of the timescales involved the outputs could be timely for a new government.

If the Committee mean business they need to take a wider perspective, be forensic and ask:

1. What were the lessons learnt from the implementation of the NPS?
2. What was achieved through the NPS? (The impact assessment should be used as evidence)
3. What happened to the library of local government procurement indicators, procurement skills programme, the Passport2Procurement eLearning tool, the sustainable procurement guidance, gateway reviews, Fitness Checks?
4. Has local government procurement gone backwards since the implementation of the NPS?
5. What was the impact (costs and benefits) of dismantling the procurement support provided by the IDeA, 4Ps and RCEs?
6. What was the impact of the Small Business Friendly Concordat?
7. Why is it that local government has been able to collaborate on purchasing since 1957 and other parts of the public sector find it so difficult?
8. Where is local government now positioned against the milestones of the NPS?
9. What were the lessons learnt from high profile failures, for example Wiral and Lancashire major service contracts, 
10. Why has central government appeared to learn so little from local government procurement?
11. What does world best of bred local government procurement look like?

The Inquiry provides a wonderful opportunity to learn and improve the delivery of public services - let's hope the Committee hear and don't bury their heads in the sand.

The greener grass of the Crown Commercial Service

We know two things: firstly, that the grass is always greener on the other side, and secondly, a bad workman always blames his tools. That's how I see the announcement of the Crown Commercial Service (CCS) - it is not the panacea to public procurement problems in the UK but a convenient placebo to buy time. It looks like a good idea but when we eventually get there, where we came from can be expected to look greener than where we have arrived.

There is no perfect organisational structure for procurement, just the most appropriate set of trade-offs for a given time. I have absolutely no doubt that if we had a centralised procurement structure at the present time, we would have just heard an announcement that decentralisation was the answer. Quite simply the grass will always be greener on the other side and the tools of the 'existing structure' are easy to blame for current failures (in this case the structure).

But more fundamentally, what is the problem we are trying to solve at the present time?

Are we seeing the green shoots of a recovery or looking at a deteriorating economy? Let's give the economy the benefit of the doubt and say we're looking at recovery - I don't think centralising will accelerate the recovery and remotely help small businesses or investment. We don't have enough organisations who are likely, at the present time, to satisfy the qualifying criteria for the 'bigger is better' contracts we can expect from the CCS.

But then think of the policy objectives the CCS will be asked to deliver - it does not strike me we have  a consensus view of of what procurement aims to achieve at the present time. For example, is it cost reduction or wider social objectives? Without that clarity what are the outcomes CCS should be measured against? Even if there were that clarity at the present time, by the time CCS hits the road we will be starting to see the warm-up routines for the next election - should the objectives be set for the recovery and can they be flexible enough to reflect a new government's manifesto?

Is there a readiness to change? How on earth could any causal observer of public procurement believe there is a readiness to change to the CCS at the minute. We continue on the hamster's wheel of making little progress on winning hearts and minds towards more collaborative procurement. Until the stakeholders hearts and minds are won, all we can expect are 'work arounds'.

Have we the skills? Well we know there are issues with contract management, but that could be solved without CCS. Would it not be better to get on top of contract management before you make the contracts bugger? Even if we got on top of contract management, we have almost no evidence of effective risk management and performance management - getting bigger is unlikely to cure that, on the contrary just magnify the detrimental impact.

I could go on but that doesn't strike me as useful, really what I'm trying to say is that we can make any structure work but we need to recognise there is no perfect structure. We can make any structure work but to do that we need a clear vision and leadership, and clarity of the outcomes to be achieved. We can make any structure work but to do that we need the right culture and skills. We can make any structure work but we need a readiness to change, excellent stakeholder engagement, change management, risk and performance management. Yes, we could make CCS work but at the present time the key ingredients just aren't in place nor are they likely to be within the envisioned timescale. We could make CCS work but history suggests it won't unless we get the foundations in place - but then if we got the foundations in place would we even need the cost of changing to CCS?

"Generally the MoJ is seen as doing good work in the procurement area"?

I'm going to leave it to others to dissect the G4S and Serco overcharging for tagging the Ministry of Justice. I fully expect a deluge of blogs. Nor do I intend to catalogue the long list of MoJ procurement issues which I have discussed previously.

But I will remind you that last September I highlighted the need to question the value for money of tagging and indeed the need to question the procurement approach including the failure to focus on outcomes.

I also want to remind you that I questioned the value of evidence given to the PASC Procurement Inquiry when one of the 'experts'' stated "Generally the MoJ in seen as doing good work in the procurement area".

The big issue to me is the decision of the Lord Chancellor to launch and internal investigation into contract management based on evidence that MoJ officials knew as far back as 2008 that there were issues with billing. If that proves to be true our profession has been discredited.

I want to learn of the evidence that was uncovered and why that wasn't reported? I want to know how broad, deep and high the awareness went? I want to know whether fraud was involved or corruption? I want to know how much money this has cost the tax payer? I want to know what will happen to tagging if there are only two providers and both are found at fault? I want to understand how these organisations have become so powerful suppliers to the public sector that it appears a blind eye is turned to past misdemeanours? I have long called for personal accountability, will we see that?

Prior to the separation of the MoJ from the Home Office, the then Home Secretary claimed the Home Office "wasn't fit for purpose" - I think we now need to understand what the MoJ Procurement Capability Reviews revealed (written and unwritten - think CQC) and how much of public procurement just isn't fit for purpose?

A spending review anomaly for procurement policy

The Spending Review provides an opportunity to gain some insights into public procurement policy, so it is worth looking slightly deeper than the common headlines of cuts, cuts, cuts.

The nugget which I want to highlight is the freedom gained by Arts Council England and the national museums to opt out of government procurement procedures. 

First it is worth reflecting on what I think was the last relevant report on DCMS procurement by the National Audit Office - at that time, (admittedly November 2005) the view was:

"Procurement is an area where the Culture, Media and Sport sector can achieve significant savings and improvements. Whilst the sector has made some progress in improving its procurement capabilities and practices, a great deal more can be done. A greater level of commitment from organisations to adopting good practice, as well as addressing specific issues such as greater collaboration between organisations when buying common goods and services, will result in greater value for money." (Sir John Bourne, 30 November, 2005).

Is the new freedom to opt out of government procurement procedures an acknowledgement that DCMS has so significantly improved procurement that they should be cut loose from the constraints applicable elsewhere in the sector? If that is the case, which I doubt, it would be useful to understand how they have brought about greater collaboration, which just has not been achieved elsewhere in the public sector, for example, the police?

Is the freedom an acknowledgement that existing government procurement procedures are inappropriate? If so, why release one part of the sector rather sort out the procedures for all departments?

Did Arts Council England and the national museums actually ask for this freedom, if so what was the business justification? What precedent has been set and how will it be applied to the next petition for 'opting out'?

What particular areas of government procurement procedures will Arts Council England and the national museums be released from and have those relaxations been risk assessed? Are major construction projects, grants, and commodity goods and services included? Have new procedures been drafted, if so, can we hear what the proposed new procedures are? Will those procedures be 'leaner'?

Assuming government procurement procedures exist to provide value for money, achieve public policy and provide a shield to protect those involved in public procurement from criticism; how will those objectives now been satisfied?

On the heels of so much debate on greater use of 'centralised' contracts, has the so called 'mandating' just been set aside?

Will the independence bring with it reduced costs for what is procured? If yes, then some serious questions need to be asked about the 'centralisation agenda'? If costs increase, how will that be justified? Will a baseline for future comparison even be established and published?

To be truthful, I just can't understand the freedom as it seems to go against the tide - I'd like to have heard the view of Francis Maude, Margaret Hodge and Bernard Jenkin?

Bring on the Procurement Star Chamber

There's something quite remarkable about the concept of the 'Star Chamber' which seems to have been lost in today's political dumbing down and popularising of the approach - it existed until 1641 to enforce laws against those so powerful that the traditional courts would never act against.

Consider the Opinion piece in today's Times, a great deal of which had already been discussed in this blog in the context of the evidence given to the Public Administration Select Committee inquiry into public procurement. Now it is clear to me that some very lame excuses were given to PASC justifying poor implementation of procurement policy and strategy. After all, if those charged with implementation can't deliver, why on earth did they, or their predecessors, not make it clear when the policies where being drafted that there was neither the readiness to change or the skills necessary to 'make it happen'. The PASC was just too chummy and lacked any real sense of personal accountability - I don't believe for one minute that much will change in the duration of this parliament.

However, I would like to pick up on one aspect of the Opinion piece and suggest a way forward:

Some mandarins are refusing to renegotiate IT and procurement contracts to get a better deal. "It's all about saving face ... they've signed off rubbish contracts and they don't want to admit it".

1. Are the mandarins actually refusing to renegotiate bad contracts?
2. Is there the scope to renegotiate the contracts anyway? Basic contract law reminds us that there is no obligation to enter into only good contracts and if you enter a bad contract, it is still a contract;
3. Is the real constraint face saving?

If we really want to bring the transparency to public procurement and accountability we need to expose and explode these myths if they are not true. But if they are the truth, we need to find a way forward so we are not replaying this discussion in another decade.

There has been a long history of 'the great and the good' of business being asked to provide their opinions on what is wrong with public procurement - it's easy to throw those stones. Yet, in almost thirty years that has delivered little change - that model just doesn't work. However, why don't we just use that type person and deploy them on Procurement Star Chambers. Let the Procurement Star Chamber sit in judgement over the implementation of public procurement policy and strategy, let it be linked, at the very least, to the civil service performance management system too. Let the Star Chamber establish if bad contracts have been entered into, where there is scope for renegotiation, and whether the  reluctance to do so is based on face saving? Bring on the Procurement Star Chamber if you want to get beyond the rhetoric and 'make' change happen.

24 hours to get your communications plan ready

It seems this weekend was a good time to bash public procurement and that the attack will continue on Monday night with Channel 4's Dispatches programme. I make no defence for public money wasted and am ashamed of some of the poor public stewardship exhibited. But the headlines can be misleading, the sound bites are easily digested and create barriers for hearing the truth. But procurement can see the media attention as an opportunity, to do that you need to think about what will be 'heard', how to respond and how to create a constructive platform for moving forward. These few days public procurement bashing can be very healthy and provide a useful opportunity for strategically repositioning procurement, if you want.

So, let's recall, Saturday's public procurement bashing centred around the Taxpayers' Alliance publication of the Bumper Book of Government Waste. The headline figure was £15bn of procurement waste per year. You can read my blog on how I believe the headlines were flawed. To me, if you are in public procurement, you need to have a quick refresh of the content of Towards Tesco, understand the key arguments, set out the pros and cons of your own organisational structure (acknowledge there is no perfect structure), be clear how you can maximise the benefits of collaborative procurement internally and externally, and set out your collaboration strategy.

Monday night's Dispatches programme provides a second bite of the cherry. In anticipation of that you should try to read the Sunday Times procurement bashing articles. Expect a revisit of Sir Philip Green's flawed report - you could read my critique. To me the focus of the bashing will be on pCards - now I've dealt with those before. You should understand the benefits of procurement cards, particularly how they can help local SMEs at the present time with cashflow problems. Also be clear about the transaction cost reductions and, contrary to the bashing, the increased control and visibility they provide. The Dispatches programme here is your ally as it highlights visibility which may not otherwise have been available. Make it clear that pCards were not the problem but inadequate governance, controls and procedures.

The timing of the media procurement bashing is also fortuitous - if the newspaper articles hadn't have been over the weekend, CEOs may not have had time to consider them. Your challenge now is to seize the opportunity and prepare a briefing paper for your CEO so that you can use media procurement bashing as part of your procurement communications strategy.

Taxpayers Alliance procurement assertions are flawed

Today's Times makes great play of The Taxpayers' Alliance, Bumper Book of Government Waste. Not only does public procurement get a bashing on page 4, but also in an Opinion piece from Matthew Sinclair (Chief Executive of the Taxpayer's Alliance) on page 26.

When I read that £15bn a year could be saved through better public procurement naturally I looked for the evidence. That led me to the source being cited as the Institute of Directors. But the Institute of Directors hadn't identified £15bn could be saved, their source was Colin Cram's report, Towards Tesco.

Now I have deliberately stayed clear of the procurement family spat on Towards Tesco, not least because I like and have great respect for those presenting the opposing arguments. However, we have to remember that the Towards Tesco was based on big assumptions too - it also stated there was an absence of reliable data.

I have serious concerns about the pragmatism of the centralisation argument and I'm not even sure if Colin's argument has been correctly interpreted. But we have reached a dangerous stage when a hypothesis presented by Colin, who is clearly committed to public procurement, is being misinterpreted and used by the Taxpayers' Alliance. We need to end the rhetoric and move to robust peer reviewed evidence to get to the most likely outcome. In the meantime, perhaps we should take all the other Taxpayers' Alliance assertions with a pinch of salt.

Are we ready for naming, blaming, shaming & taming procurement

What do you think about the Health Secretary's plan to expose health consultants who want to opt out of performance tables?

I'm in favour. In fact I'd go further - I want to understand the outcomes achieved, problems encountered in the operating theatre, proportion of NHS/private work, the proportion of their career spent on my particular area of concern, and, what's more, I want to  have the option of seeing that information on an NHS validated webpage or when I am sitting in my GPs surgery discussing a referral. Why? Well, I have had a number of operations which have had complications in theatre, serious infections, and conflicting opinions. I have also been given, what other consultants convinced me was inappropriate treatment and inappropriate advice. I also want to see the cloak of aloofness removed from the consultant so that they also remember I am the focus of their attention.

While I'm on that rant let me share just one of many bad experiences. I waited quite some time for an appointment to see a consultant. I then waited long after my appointment time to be admitted to his inner sanctum. While I was waiting, of course there were the signs prohibiting the use of mobile phones. I was duly informed I could be seen. No sooner was I in the throne room than his mobile phone rang, he said, "excuse me I have to take this call". Believe it or not the call was from his son and they discussed his performance on the rugby pitch. Not that surprisingly the child had more of the consultants time than I had. Did I feel I'd experienced patient centred care?

Thankfully, I have also experienced absolutely world class care. On at least one occasion having to be reassured they had not mistaken me for a private patient.

Remove the cloak of mystery and I can make informed decisions as to whether or not I trust the consultant. Remove the cloak and I can see beyond the hot air. Remove the cloak and I can opt not to go near the poor performers.

Now if we adopted a similar position in public procurement things might change too. We might learn who is in the wrong job, who doesn't implement procurement policy, whether centralised contracts are justified. Let's forget about massaging the data overload and opacity of contracts let. Just let us know which procurement departments achieve agreed objectives. If they don't use the central contracts, just let them tell us why - we can then make an informed judgement as to whether the 'centralised contracts' are at fault or the procurement leads. If we see enough CPOs saying the contracts aren't used because they aren't fit for purpose, then maybe that is useful for reviewing the strategy. If procurement policy initiatives are not being implemented then maybe we have the wrong CPOs. Are we ready for naming, blaming and shaming in public procurement? Perhaps we're content with the cloak of opacity.

Police procurement on the line

There's something very odd about a room where the most common item of clothing worn appears to be a white shirt and the main subject of discussion is how difficult it is to buy white shirts.

Yes, that's what the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee seemed to focus on at its meeting on 5 June when the subject was really Police Procurement.

However, this evidence session should, in my mind, be included within the Public Administration Select Committee's Inquiry into Public Procurement. The evidence had a much more realistic assessment of the difficulties associated with centralisation.

The Committee started with a reality check: why, when Gershon, in 2004, highlighted the need for a 'uniform' approach to buying white shirts for the 43 police forces,  has such a seemingly simple aspiration proved so difficult to implement? Yet, that's the question which needs an unequivocal answer to, and plan to address, before 'the grand collaborative public procurement vision' should be embarked upon.

Theoretically, the silver bullet has been found for the police in the form of the Procurement Hub. It appears the aspiration was that there would have been 100% sign-up to the Hub last year, yet so far only 2%, yes, TWO PERCENT has been reached. The new aspiration is that 80% will be achieved by the end of the current parliament. Asked, what milestone has been set for 12 months time on the journey from 2% to 80%, there was a sense of embarrassment - that question seemed to take the Permanent Secretary by surprise! It does make you question if there is the least likelihood of the 'stretch target' being achieved.


What are the problems with bringing about increased ownership of the Procurement Hub? Answer:

• Cultural issues;
• Changes in processes; and
• Resistance to change.

But hold on a second, the Procurement Hub will not standardise on one uniform white shirt, or one supplier, it's a collaborative 'framework'. Sounds a bit like legalising 'pick 'n' mix' as opposed to Gershon's vision.

No cause for celebration at PASC Procurement Inquiry

It's rare for me not to be interested in a discussion on procurement but I'm afraid Monday's PASC Procurement Inquiry even turned me off. It lacked any sense of enthusiasm or ambition. Instead it had a sense of resignation and despondency.  I left the discussion with a complete absence of confidence in the change management process.

What can you say about a discussion which starts off with the change champion saying procurement reform is not ambitious enough, hasn't done what was set out in current plans, ... is old fashioned, long, expensive, mitigating against small and younger businesses, .... From there it was downhill all the way, including the usual mantra of a lack of skills and lack of any serious contract management. Inspirational - not at all. Encouraging - no. Belief in the change - no.

The glimmer of hope in a potential single source 'closed loop contract' for recycled paper which would lead to a new paper mill had the potential for celebration - but stakeholder ownership hasn't been gained. Senior mandarins are considered partially to blame, yet we were also told "when people really want it to happen it can and does". Personally I would have liked someone to have asked how long that contract lock-in will be and what protection will be in place to protect against long-term supplier power?

Then we heard about reducing the cost of sending out giro cheques, yet no one asked why are giro cheques being sent out at all as opposed to BACS payments?

Procurement reform appears to be aspirational as opposed to performance managed - so all the lessons from Michael Barber's unit seem to have been forgotten!

I could go on, but the most disheartening message, to me, was the assertion that the "primary objective through procurement is getting the goods and services needed by the citizens at the best price". With a message like that is it any wonder there is inertia.

Jeremy Hunt's recommendations for procurement improvement

On the 26 March the Heath Secretary outlined his response to the Francis Report; the investigation into healthcare failings at Mid Staffs. I have been watching some of the NHS discussions and, in parallel, following the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC) Inquiry into Public Procurement. As I listened to the discussions on the Francis Report I had a vision of Bernard Jenkin (Chair of PASC) having had coffee with the Health Secretary and each accidentally leaving with the others papers. Just to clarify, I wondered what would have happened had suggested improvements for the health service been transferred across as recommendations for public procurement improvement.

First a caveat, I am not in any way trying to undermine or trivialise the significance of the horrors experienced by patients and their families at Mid Staffs, but merely exploring transferability of the proposed NHS improvements to public procurement. PASC will need to come up with something significant in the light of the conflicting evidence their Inquiry uncovered and decades of inertia, while CIPS has long argued that the procurement profession should be viewed as an equal of other professions. Now I pose the question: "Is what's good for the goose, good for the gander?".

Let's consider the Health Secretary's rationale for a response as an example of what I mean:

"Actions that must ensure [public procurement] is what every [procurement] professional and [citizen] wants - a service that is true to [government] values, that puts [citizens] first, and treats [it's users and the market] with dignity, respect and [professionalism]." 

Hopefully the above provides a feel for this blog, so let's see what you think?

It is recognised there is a need for culture change in the NHS. It is also inconceivable that PASC will not agree there is a need for culture change in the light of the evidence they considered. While the NHS needs to ensure a culture of 'patients first' is embedded, public procurement, I would suggest, needs to get on top of implementing policy, reducing costs, managing risk, working more strategically and collectively across silos, and with perhaps a little more honesty and humility.

I applaud the government for recognising mistakes happen in healthcare and there is a need to learn from those mistakes while fostering a culture of managed risk. Is it not true that public sector has too high a level of risk aversion embedded within its culture. Public procurement needs to also accept that mistakes happen and yet proactively encourage more innovation through prototype procurements. I think the current NHS system of explaining risks to patients prior to an operation is good but I have very, very rarely seen anything remotely similar applied in public procurement - why is that acceptable?

Global Manufacturing Festival talks Procurement Strategy

Thursday's Global Manufacturing Festival was not the place to be if you think procurement is about 'lowest price wins'. That's where Andrew Miller MP, Chair of the Science and Technology Select Committee (the sort of person you would expect to be able to do quite big sums) weighed in to the current debate on the role of UK public procurement. I don't think Miller was invited to give evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee inquiry into procurement, but it would be interesting to have his views expressed.

Miller argues that the government needs to be "more holistic" in procurement strategy and take into account strategic economic benefits such as job creation, skills and tax income:

They've got to also take into account whether procuring from a foreign company genuinely produces overall better value for money or whether if you take into account the potential tax revenues, people in employment, the re-skilling of people that come through having high value jobs, whether sometimes they ought to give greater priority to British companies.

That's not the voice of a mere a lone critic but, to me, an echo of Heseltine's definition of public procurement:

The simple answer is to secure value for money for the public purse. Who can argue with that? The problem is that it is often equated with short term, lowest cost procurement which ignores the issues about the country’s industrial base – the exploitation of R&D, the skills we need and the creation of jobs. It also ignores international practice. No country of which I have any knowledge takes so simple a view. Although crucial in major policy areas such as defence or aerospace, the same issues are everyday challenges for ministers whether they are placing contracts for high speed trains or new IT systems. We are concerned about the destiny of our manufacturing sector but we do not spend enough time exploring the ways government can work to support it.

While PASC deliberate on the role of public procurement and one of the Chancellor's allies, IMF commander-in-chief Christine Lagarde, tells George Osborne his austerity strategy isn't working, I wonder are we starting to reach the tipping point which moves political procurement from cost cutting to value adding. Pursuit of wider procurement policy objectives would be healthy. However, the reality is that cost cutting, economic and social benefits, and sourcing from non-British firms are not mutually exclusive, yet, narrow-minded jingoism is unlikely to deliver long-term benefit if other countries follow suit. Equally, you have to consider what would have been the impact on the UK economy if it were not for foreign owned hotel chains, car manufacturers, steel companies, IT companies, communications network providers, banks, newspapers, and even teabag providers.

I've procured quite a bit of sponsorship in the past.  There's something ironic about criticising sponsors when they're paying the bills, therefore it would have been interesting to have been a fly on the wall when the sponsors of the Global Manufacturing Festival heard that non-British companies were persona non grata!

Perhaps it will fall on procurement policy makers to inject reality and pragmatism into the debate.

N.B. I confess that although the views expressed in this blog are my own, I work for an Indian organisation which employs over 50,000 in the UK.