Is there a lesson for procurement in Tory's forgotten manifesto?

The suggestion that the Chancellor's advisors simply "forgot the manifesto"  may well be a symptom of incompetence or just contempt for previous commitments but it does have lessons for procurement leaders.  First let's think about the purpose of a manifesto - it sets out the basis on which the political party seeks election and says "if you elect us, we'll do this".  It is a bit like a contract commitment with the electorate. It is a commitment, through choice, to pursue a particular strategy. Simply 'forgetting' that policy commitment and strategy is a serious breach of trust.

So what's the 'forgetting the manifesto' lesson for procurement? Well, I have long since stopped being surprised when I find out that procurement staff are oblivious to the higher-level policies, and even their own prior commitments, which are supposed to shape their decisions.  For example, a commitment that all staff complete anti-bribery training - when you ask the staff when they last completed it they were unaware of such a commitment.  Then there's the Fairtrade commitments, the sustainable procurement commitments, prompt payment commitments, .... need I go on? Breach of all these 'policy' commitments represents a reputational risk at the very least.  Let's face it the commitments are rarely made without a lot of deliberation and business case justification.

Many of those commitments are voluntary but there are also statutory commitments - surprisingly there appears to be little external policing of those, for example, the Equality Act, Modern Slavery Act and Bribery Act.

Strange thing is when you interview staff for a position, quite frequently they can trot out all the relevant commitments!

Is this a case of selective memory or perhaps just ignorance? Both could be factors but they are unlikely to be the only causes.

My suggestion to ensure there is no 'forgetting' is that:

1. Complete an audit to identify and catalogue external and internal commitments;
2. Embed within risk management, yes, even at the top table;
3. Raise awareness; 
4. Ensure no commitments are overlooked through the use of checklists for both strategy and tactical decisions. 

The UK Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer now appear to have to backtrack due to 'forgetting the manifesto' - surely there's a lesson for procurement risk management to make sure there isn't a similar carryover in your organisation.

Lagarde conviction should be a warning for all those involved in procurement governance

Today Christine Lagarde was convicted of criminal charges of negligence for failing to challenge a decision and merely rubber stamping.  Lagarde, currently the IMF chief, former French Finance Minister and ally of former UK Chancellor George Osborne in pursuit of his austerity strategy, has long been one of the most respected commentators and regularly appeared on Newsnight, for example.  She would have been an exemplar in a world when politicians are losing respect. While she will not be spending Christmas in jail, the view is that she could have been looking at one year in prison and a €13,000 fine.

This highly unusually high profile case must serve as a wake-up call to those involved in governance; rubber stamping is insufficient.  Governance is about representing the interests of the organisation and protecting it through scrutiny and asking clever questions, and dare I say, particularly those involved in investments and procurement.  The 'professional' experts should have nothing to fear in providing assurance of how they have arrived at recommendations.  The scrutiny of the 'approvers' is the last QA line of defence before committing the organisation to what could prove, in retrospect, to have been a mistake.

Here in Northern Ireland, the First Minister, Arlene Foster, is facing calls to step aside while an investigation is carried out into her involvement in the daft Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme, which provided the perverse incentive of rewarding users to over-heat their properties.  One can assume that the Lagarde outcome will stir the pot at the Northern Ireland Assembly more. Did, Foster, when she was overseeing the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, ask clever questions, did she merely rubber stamp, or ...?

I am reminded of David Steele's defence when he was challenged over some of the decisions in the Scottish Parliament building fiasco  - Ministers were kept in the dark by civil servants!  I think that escape route is unlikely to be acceptable anymore or haven't the lessons been learnt?

After years of working on governance processes and the associated risk management, I think that both Lagarde and Foster are far from alone in how they have 'exercised' governance, and I doubt the lessons will be heeded or welcomed by many.

Gove turns his guns on procurement and programme management

One time thought to be a contender to become PM, former Secretary of State for Education, and Secretary of State for Justice has set his sights on public sector procurement and programme management professionals today, in a Comment piece in the Times. I will watch with interest the Letters section to see if CIPS reply.

Gove does a fine job of cataloguing procurement and programme management disasters. Indeed, many of the cases he cites are those I have blogged about in the past and/or used as case studies when training.  I will spare you an echoing of the cases; the average man or women on the street is familiar with many of them anyway.

While it is interesting that Gove has put pen to paper on a subject dear to many of us, what is particularly interesting is who he considers to blame - the 'Sir Humphrey's but not the Ministers.

Gove calls for a shift to weekly reporting on progress to Parliament of procurements and programmes. Would there be enough Parliamentary time and, if there was the time, would we see any interest from MPs?

Controversially he also wants to

see the names of civil servants responsible for these programmes to be published, their explanations for failure (or success) recorded and those who've failed be removed while those who can demonstrate clear, measurable, success get promoted. I know this concept- let's call it accountability - may be somewhat revolutionary for our civil service.

This is an interesting notion but isn't Gove missing the point about why we have Ministers in charge of government departments?  It is the democratically elected politicians who have to call those in their own departments to account.  It is the democratically elected politicians who have to rein in the pursuit of unrealistic political timescales.  It is the democratically elected politicians who have to develop the skills to scrutinise and manage professionals to ensure that they deliver on their objectives. Yes, perhaps civil servants need to use a louder voice in explaining to politicians the risks of pursuing some projects. But you can't just point the finger at the civil servants without recognising a failure of political performance management.

Also worrying is the implication that civil servants are being influenced by lobby groups. Can he really believe that, and if he does, why doesn't he blow the whistle on what really amounts to corruption.

This, one time, very influential political may well have lost a lot of his power, but should he ever regain it, CIPS will have a major problem if they don't educate the former Secretary of Education now.

  

Approval processes, the Queen and Parliament

I've been giving a lot of thought lately to approval processes for big investments, not just procurement. Part of my thinking has been concerned with how you would define a good approval process and evaluate the 'As-Is' - my early thinking is that it would exhibit the following:

• Robust governance at the appropriate level;
• Clarity of who owns and is accountable for the business case;
• Consistency in application;
• Visibility and transparency - knowing when a given need is in the process and what's happening;
• Understood by users;
• Pragmatism;
• Integration with the wider eco-system.

How do those attributes sound to you?  What else would you include?

Anyway, news that the The Queen is now seeking approval from parliament for £369m of repairs to one of her homes was timely.  Basically Parliament hold the purse strings and need to approve the cost of the repairs at Buckingham Palace, but the current issue is why, within 12 months, has the estimated cost rose from £150m to £369m for the ten-year refit?  

We are told that last year's estimate "was one of several estimates" and didn't include inflation!  Hold on, what is the current rate of inflation, isn't it just under 1%, over the next ten years will that be radically different?  Of the 'several estimates' received last year, what was the range, and was there some selective presentation of the figures to secure last years approval in principle? It's surprising they didn't blame it on Brexit too.

I think it may be interesting to understand why such an investment is now needed - was there no investment in recent years in preventative maintenance? Is this all reactive?  Surely those managing the Royal Estate should be concerned with preventative maintenance and there shouldn't be a need for such a massive investment?

But let's also remember that this latest discussion is about approval to invest the now £369m. When I discuss an integrated approach in my list of attributes of an approval process, I'm referring to integration with what happens after approval has been granted.  I want to see approvals within stated tolerances and subsequent governance and scrutiny in the contract award and implementation, including project management. Without that Parliament would be buying a promise and abdicating responsibility for ensuing actual value for money is achieved, not just the aspiration.  There's another interesting question here, if you recall Westminster Palace is also in need of a massive refurbishment - is there no strategy for looking across the portfolio and planning accordingly?

Were procurement voices heard at Bristol's European Green Capital?

I'm sure it will have escaped many of you that Bristol was the European Green Capital in 2015. The Times have just revelled some of the £12m of procurement's involved:

• £37,000 wiring a tree with a sound and light system activated by falling beechnuts, only to discover that it was predictably going to be a lean year for beechnuts; 
• £49,200 creating an artificial fog over footbridge;
• £84,000 for life size wicker sculpture of whales;
• £5,000 for a guest speaker;
• £3,800 for pies provided to guests at a launch party;
• £25,00 for a 'happy cities' survey;
• £6,000 for a circus group;
• £18,000 for use of 'Shaun the sheep' image on promotional materials;
• £1,000 a month for a press-cuttings service.

Now let's assume that proper procurement policies were in place and processes complied with - although we know that often 'arms length' bodies feel they are beyond that.  Let's also assume that there was some benchmarking to ensure that the various deals represented good value for money.

The previous Mayor of Bristol claims the year was a "massive success". Unsurprisingly, others don't agree but is that criticism justified? There must have been a strategy for the year and that should have drilled down to the various event components - those responsible for governance had a responsibility to ensure that was scrutinised and justified and not just 'rubber stamped'. It would have been good if that plan had been published and consulted upon as that would have deflected some of the later criticisms.

It would also have been good if the initiative were subjected to an independent outcome assessment - that would have demonstrated the economic and environmental benefits gained - the ratio of cost to benefits.

As with so many of these types of initiatives money was pooled from various big funders: £1m from the City Council to pump-prime, and that brought a further £7m from the government £3m-£4m from the private sector.  I actually know nothing about the governance structure which was put in place, but to me, Bristol City Council probably came out on top. However, I would like to have seen a pro-rata allocation of influence at the governance table based on the funding provided - those funders had real 'skin in the game' and needed to be clear these were procurements they had confidence in as opposed to rubber stamping, of worse, giving without control. I wonder how many procurement voices were heard at that table?

Fifa's "Unfavourable" contract should be a warning for all Board members

I'm sure many of you heard the news this morning of the latest PR disaster to befall FIFA, namely, that its President signed a contract "unfavourable to Fifa" and in doing so "violated his fiduciary duties and acted against the interest of Fifa...".

I have to admit this is the first time I have heard such a phrase used so I'l have to watch as the story unfolds to learn more.

I assume a contract can be unfavourable to an organisation under the following circumstances:

• Contracting for something which is not required;
• Contracting on contractual terms which place more power than is necessary with the supplier;
• Contracting on commercial terms which do not represent value for money;
• Contracting for a longer term than makes commercial sense.

However, the news reminded me of one of my early jobs which included the signing and sealing of contracts - way back in 1974 when I was a mere 17 year old.

Let me first tell you about 'the Seal'. The was stored in a strongroom. The key for the strongroom was kept in a safe. That key was used to open the main strongroom door - which was really heavy to move. Then a separate key was used to get through the next door which looked like prison bars. Then  a further two keys were used to unlock what looked like an enormous vice. Only then could you seal the contracts by placing each of the signed contracts in the gap between the vice and closing the vice - the contract then had the imprint of the seal embedded on it.

However, prior to sealing the contract, I first had to get the contract signed by the Town Clerk. I'd make an appointment, fold and mark each of the contracts so that the place for signature was clear and then place each of the contracts before the Town Clerk while he signed, in all probability multi-tasking by drinking a cup of coffee or reading other papers. Success, for me, was minimising the amount of time spent by the Town Clerk signing the contracts.

The contract signed by the Town Clerk then had to have the Lord Mayor's signature too.  Once again an appointment was made, I sat with the Lord Mayor and we made small talk as I placed each contract before him for signature. The objective: get in, get the contracts signed, and out as quickly as possible!

That's a lot of formality for a reason (and from memory the threshold at which contracts had to be sealed was as low as £15,000) but yet there was virtually no scrutiny. The contracts were signed by both the Town Clerk and Lord Mayor without their reading on the assumption that those in the Town Solicitor's Office and Purchasing had spent time making sure everything was in order prior to signature.

I wonder will Sepp Blatter use a similar argument as his defence, that he was merely completing a formality on the assumption that the due diligence was completed by others as part of their 'day job'?

But let's remember that those who 'sign on the line' do so for a reason, only they have the authority to commit the organisation to contracts. They are representing those who placed them in power and gave them the authority to commit on their behalf. Whether or not Sepp Blatter manages to exhibit the skills of Houdini is secondary, the allegation that he signed an unfavourable contract should serve as a reminder to all those Board Members who sign contracts of the need to protect themselves, if not their organisations.

The UK needs to be an intelligent giver (procurer)

Friday's Times reported an investigation into the UK's "scandal of squandered overseas aid".  At the centre of the story is the UK's commitment to spend 0.7% of GDP on overseas aid - now a legal obligation and endorsed by all three of the main political parties.

The issue is not whether or not the UK should be benevolent, or indeed whether we should be more generous, but Dfid's strategy of channelling the aid through multi-national agencies, such as the EU and the UN without retaining sufficient control and scrutiny of the spending. The suggestion is that the UK have outsourced its giving and, in so doing don't have a voice in scrutiny.

We are led to believe that over £6bn a year is contributed through the international agencies, 60% of the total amount, and that £6bn is not subject to UK oversight.

The giving of this £6bn is actually a procurement - the UK pay out some money in the anticipation of a delivery. Giving through the international agencies does not shackle the hands of the UK in terms of exercising its control. On the contrary the aggregation of the UKs aid with that of other countries should lead to a more strategic approach and more effective targeting. As one of the biggest 'givers', or should we say procurers, the UK is in a stronger negotiating position in demanding reforms and evidence of impact. Demanding reforms and evidence of impact is just good stewardship.

The incoming UK Government need to bring a new assertiveness to the aid strategy. They need to recognise that this is procurement. They need to develop a negotiating strategy. They need to have their own objectives which ring-fence how aid will be spend through the international agencies and they they to significantly improve accountability and performance management. Where that approach is resisted the UK shouldn't withdraw aid but instead redirect through channels where the required level of accountability will be satisfied. That would deliver the required value for money, accountability and improved impact.

Tesco, the Groceries Code Adjudicator and CIPS

You are probably already aware that the Groceries Code Adjudicator has announced that her first inquiry will be into Tesco's 'supply chain bullying'. Of course this is not the first inquiry to touch Tesco's fallen angel procurement, it joins those of the Serious Fraud Office and the Financial Reporting Council.

You may have thought this was an appropriate time for the newly badged Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply to show its teeth too, but I was amazed to learn that David Noble, CIPS CX response to the news of the Groceries Code Adjudicator's inquiry was:

"This remedial action is tantamount to closing the stable door once the horse has bolted"

What on earth is the business world to understand from such a platitude? Surely, CIPS are not advocating the potential breach of the Code should not be investigated? What action are CIPS proposing to take in demonstrating its own Ethical Code has teeth? Would this not have been the right time for CIPS to have championed the Inquiry and champion good supply chain management practice?

Is the Tesco storm indicative of a governance & policy failure?

Today's news that allegedly three more Tesco staff, who have links with procurement, have been suspended continues to rub salt in the wound and negatively impact on reputation.

While I have discussed Tesco's procurement many times, I now find myself asking: "is the weakness in the governance and policy as opposed to the people?"

If the press are correct, those suspended now include: the commercial director, the food commercial director, three category directors (group wine director, director of convenience foods, and director of impulse purchases) and someone responsible for sourcing.

It seems impossible to believe all those suspended are mavericks or indeed that they were pursuing a strategy concealed from those with strategic oversight. If that is possible, then how many other areas of Tesco's governance lacked scrutiny?

Nevertheless, it may be a good time to gain insights into the procurement governance and policy of Tesco. If that was a fault, you can hardly blame the staff. Even if Tesco replace the staff, in the absence of addressing governance and policy failures, the corrections will only be cosmetic.

It may also be a good time for those charged with procurement governance and policy to ask, "could Tesco's woes be replicated here?".

Strategic procurement programmes: Before and after

We're all familiar with the 'before and after' images which so often paint a picture that suggests 'after' is more attractive than 'before'. If only that were the case with strategic procurements.

After years of 'before' trumpeting the anticiapted aspirational success of the NHS National Programme for IT, a programme which appeared to be the offspring of political egotism, the first signs of faltering, and the cosmetics of a name change, now politicians want answers:

"There has to be a reckoning. We have to know how much money has been squandered and what could have been done instead."

"If the people letting the contract have made a catastrophic, gargantuan mistake then there is an opportunity cost. It is the taxpayer who has to fork out money for what should have been spent n services they need."

To me the NPfIT was clear who was leading and the governance structure to be used. But back in 2011 I asked what happened to the application of Gateway Reviews on the Programme. Of course MPs received NAO reports on the Programme's progress too - they were not ignorant of the risks.

So when the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee sit down looking for answers, I hope they start by considering their own role in oversight - didn't they have a responsibility to the electorate? They could ask about political pressure that that was exerted and if civil servants 'pushed back'? They could then ask about who was getting paid for Programme leadership, where, when and why it went wrong? Then they could get the detailed findings of the Gateway Reviews? Then look at the risk register, how it was reviewed and when and what actions were taken? Then they could look at similar debacles, of which there are many, forget the political rhetoric and posturing? Finally they must ensure an environment exists which ensures there are very real penalties in place for those who should have blown the whistle on this and similar programmes yet didn't - did they lack the knowledge or the spine?

Unfortunately the 'after' looks fairly ugly for this Programme but perhaps the Beast could spawn some Beauty's for the future.

Talking rubbish

I've just returned from a great holiday but whether for good or bad had no internet, therefore no news and no blogs. Hopefully I will be able to share with you some of my holiday observations though over the coming weeks.

Today's news in The Times that 'Councils waste £200m on rubbish bins of all colours' naturally caught my eye. The headline was supposedly based on a report 'Wasted Opportunities' by the Circular Economy Task Force. Too bad the report doesn't provide the evidence to back such a claim up.

But The Times write-up also quotes one of the Report authors, Dustin Benton, who said that "analysis of 40 councils' policies on procuring wheelie bins showed that only two had co-operated on purchasing".  Surely the assumption that councils waste £200m is not based on such a small sample, or was it based on muliplying a potential saving in one council by the number of councils in the UK - sadly we aren't told.

It is also surprising that Dustin (Bin) expected find the answers as to how councils procure wheelie bins through a review of policies on wheelie bin procurement - I have never seen such a policy but have seen the evidence of many councils making use of consortium buying for bins. Why didn't the author ask the question of the local government consortia: "how many councils buy their wheelie bins through your arrangements?"

So yet again council procurement is presented as incompetent - shame that more reliable evidence or a defence wasn't presented.

PSNI dysfunctional procurement strategy: A case study or 'who done it' mystery?

Two years ago I discussed the PSNI's procurement of temporary staff, many of whom had just retired from jobs in the same organisation. This week the Northern Ireland Assembly's PAC published its inquiry report - ten recommendations of which seven relate to procurement. The 'case' should be of interest to all those organisations which make use of Agency staff. 

Those with an interest in procurement strategy as opposed to public policy could look at the Inquiry slightly differently. Is this one of the few situations where there is evidence of a procurement approach actually working in opposition to the intended outcome of the legislation? Cynically, was a procurement approach requested which would satisfy the PSNI's (Police Service of Northern Ireland) objective of 'getting round' the need for changing the personnel? Put slightly differently, was this an 'intended strategy' to match objectives set for procurement or an example of poor procurement?

First, some background. The transformation of the make-up of the police was one of the core commitments of the Good Friday (Northern Ireland Peace) Agreement. Basically there was a desire to have a smaller police service (a peace dividend) and more balance in the mix of Protestant/Roman Catholic police officers. Former RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary - the old police service) officers were given the option of early retirement while a parallel recruitment campaign was put in place to balance the make-up of the new PSNI ). But the procurement approach resulted in more than 1,000 retired RUC officers, 19% of those who took early retirement, being brought back as agency workers to the new PSNI. £106m was spent between 2004 and 2012 on these Agency staff who had just left the RUC. Had those offices been reemployed directly by PSNI they would have had to repay their severance lump sum, which was not the case if they were hired as Agency staff.

Yet again, there was a lack of competitive tendering (you may also find Peter Smith's post today on a similar issue at MOD of interest). The service delivery commenced in 2002 but the competitive tendering was only in 2008. There had been a legacy contract in place for permanent staff which had a throughput of £2m per year, but a variation on that contract to include 'temps' led to a spend of £44m over four years.

Hodge should demand even deeper transparency on public procurement decision making

I am a great admirer of Margaret Hodge's forensic examination of public procurement - she seems to have honed the skill of extracting the information others don't seem able to. So I read with interest today's the report in the Guardian which claims she has suggested the DWP may be on the verge of meltdown major contracts and has called for greater transparency.

The article is definitely worth a read, particularly if you are a public sector procurement practitioner who "simply have to up their game and get a grip" - a sentiment which Francis Maude seemed to agree with in his parallel interview on Radio 4's Today programme (start to listen around 2:21).

Hodge appears to be calling for greater transparency on contract management, particularly with major contracts. Personally I think that falls short of what is needed. I think, for major contracts, we should see greater transparency on the pre-award decision making and options appraisal. Let me explain.

When obfuscation meets incisive questioning on collaborative procurement

On the 22 June the NI Assembly Public Accounts Committee published its report on collaborative procurement in Northern Ireland - far from a glowing endorsement for those leading on collaborative procurement.

However, as some of you will recognise I am intrigued by some of the oral evidence sessions at public procurement inquires. The Report includes the witness evidence given by key players in civil service procurement in Northern Ireland to the Committee on 5 June 2013. On this occasion those asking the questions were remarkably well informed on public procurement and their expectations. Unlike so many of the Inquiries I have discussed previously (for example, the recent CLG Committee Inquiry), the MLAs were not prepared to be distracted but asked probing and detailed questions - to me they were exemplary in their scrutiny.

So what do I mean by probing and not being distracted? Let's look at the questioning regarding the CPD (Central Procurement Directorate), a hybrid organisation who, according to the evidence do not procure anything (#4 and #138) but provide guidance. The CPD was set up in 2002 and in their evidence said "we have been making procurement processes more efficient over a longer period than some other jurisdictions" (#18) - by other jurisdictions you can take it they include England, Scotland and Wales. Let's remember that Northern Ireland is quite small and is really about the size of one of the bigger counties in England, so perhaps when comparing progress towards collaborative procurement a better comparison may have been with the Yorkshire Purchasing Organisation (YPO) or Central Buying Consortium (CBC).

Scepticism, the pursuit of happiness and procurement

I remember, around 20 years ago, insisting I signed-off a consultant's report before it was presented to the major decision-making body for approval. The budget holder was aghast and saw me as being awkward. Then we discovered the consultant's recommendations were flawed and, had their recommendation gone through, the wrong choice would have been made. Sometimes the CPO shouldn't be too deferential.

There was a terrific example of the little guy being proved right in last week's Guardian. A leading academic in the field of mathematics of happiness, had the smile taken off her face when a Master's student exposed a flaw in her argument. Now the text books need to be rewritten.

This isn't the first time Goliath's of academia have been laid low by a sceptical David. You may recall a not dissimilar case last year when the highly influential, Reinhart and Rogoff, who had supposedly cracked austerity had flaws in their analysis exposed by a postgrad student.

The next time you encounter someone presenting a strong argument for some procurement decision which you don't feel quite comfortable with, I suggest you remember, Brown and Walker - the two Giant slayers of academics - and recognise that even those who expect deference can be wrong and if they are right, surely testing the robustness of the argument is something the CPO should do anyway.

Bad Pharma, data manipulation & procurement inquiries

Richard Bacon MP, a member of the Public Accounts Committee, gave a very good interview on the Today programme this morning. I have listened to Bacon during various PAC procurement related inquiries and have always been impressed - to me he grasps key procurement issues very quickly and provides excellent scrutiny and probing. 

Although he did make reference to the NHS being a monopoly buyer, his interview wasn't about procurement but the publication of clinical research, or more specifically, the problems of drug companies withholding information which doesn't suit their vested commercial interests. I discussed some of these issues in my review of Ben Goldacre's Bad Pharma. 

However, he made a number of comments which are particularly relevant to procurement, for example, stating that "The whole point of scientific research is that you take all the data ..." because cherry-picking and just using research which suits your vested interests distorts the truth and leads to false impressions. 

I would like PAC to reflect on that when they consider procurement evidence too.

Celebrity advice, BMJ and lessons for procurement scrutiny

The latest issue of the British Medical Journal includes an interesting paper on the why the public follow celebrities' medical advice. To me, this paper is particularly relevant to the current CLG Committee Inquiry into local government procurement but is also relevant to procurement decision making, in general, when perceived 'experts' (celebrities) provide advice.

The BMJ paper discusses the positive influence which celebrities can have in highlighting health issues, but cautions against celebrity 'quacks' whose advice is listened to, even when it is dangerous, if adhered to. The question is 'Why do celebrities utterances and endorsements carry so much weight even though they lack any evidence, qualifications and specific experience?' The paper draws on economics, marketing, and psychology literature to provide an answer.

One of the reasons is that the public are bombarded with competing information and in order to make sense of that information:

people naturally look for signals that indicate one source as being more credible and effective than another. Owing to the vaulted status of celebrities in society, their endorsements act as signals of superiority that distinguish the endorsed item from competitors, encouraging people to change their health behaviors accordingly. 

[Celebrity] credibility may stem from the halo effect of celebrities' success, which biases people's judgments of celebrities' other traits and gives them a cloak of generalised trustworthiness that extends well beyond their industry or expertise. Celebrities are in turn perceived to have greater credibility than their non-celebrity counterparts, such as doctors, despite having less medical knowledge and experience.  

I don't see the problem of celebrity advice being isolated to the medical world. I also feel that 'celebrity status' can be more widely defined - isn't it something about putting someone on a pedestal. I have frequently observed the advice of procurement specialists being swallowed up in the aura of 'celebrity' status.

Social Value Act, social benefit clauses & SRO at CLG Committee Inquiry on procurement

And so to the fifth evidence session of the CLG Committee Inquiry into procurement. The first panel representing the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, National Council for Voluntary Organisations, and The Joseph Rowntree Foundation - all organisations which have previously helped move the procurement improvement debate forward.

To set the witnesses off to a good start and feel relaxed, the Chair started with one of those classic sextuple questions witnesses must, by now, be starting to expect:

One of the things we will be looking at is how procurement might be used for a number of objectives. We will begin by looking at how it might be used by local councils to tackle social disadvantage and poverty. Do you think councils are actually doing this effectively? Are they getting it right, or is there more they could be doing? Who would like to start?

Would anyone seriously have expected the witnesses to answer: "Actually, I think councils are really doing the absolute maximum that could be done". 

That reply wasn't heard but instead we heard that making an impact was down to the culture of officers and how procurement and economic development work together. I agree that there needs to be effective linkage between economic development and procurement but there's a flaw in the answers as they suggest officer driven policy and strategy and made no reference to political leadership. To me, in local government, elected members need to drive and lead the initiative - it is elected members who have to decide on competing priorities and then officers implement and are performance managed. If officers lead, to me, there is a high risk that their own personal agenda are pursued contrary to those of the democratically accountable leadership.

Now, let's reflect on that a bit further, three witnesses and not one of them initially mentions political leadership, yet, in the follow-up question, when political leadership is mentioned by the questioner, surprise, surprise, suddenly: "Political leadership is key, because it tells officers this is a high priority on the long agenda of things they have to deal with..." - call me a cynic, but had the questioner not mentioned political leadership would that key ingredient have been identified?

A tale of two sides of the same coin for the CLG procurement inquiry

On Tuesday I discussed the first of the two CLG local government procurement inquiry evidence sessions at Sheffield held on 18 November. I have been following the oral evidence sessions but the Committee will also take into consideration the written evidence submitted.

The earlier session on the 18 November appeared, to me, to be riddled with anecdotal evidence and unreliable answers to poorly framed questions. Nevertheless, it did suggest that there is an issue with stakeholders perception of what happens in local government procurement. It also suggested that the 8 Principles of Good Commissioning and the Compact are Whitehall theory as opposed to what the market appears to experience in Yorkshire and Humberside. Surprisingly the Committee don't probe these areas.

The second session provided an opportunity to hear from the other side of the coin, two councillors from Sheffield, Sheffield's Director of Commercial Services (also the regional lead on procurement) and  two representatives from YPO.

This session was unusual in that the evidence of councillors was taken. However, we only heard from two cabinet members and there weren't even any questions on how Overview & Scrutiny members might be engaged in strategic procurement.

We learnt that Sheffield, thankfully have moved from a position of building cost inflators into contracts. I have to say I have never before come across a system where contractors are guaranteed annual price increases.

A tale of two cities for CLG procurement inquiry: Sheffield & Sheffield

The CLG Inquiry into procurement rolled into Sheffield on the 18 November. This initially impressed me as it provided an opportunity to get out and feel the pulse on the ground. I say initially, as it transpired during the evidence that the Committee had pre-purchased tickets for the 3.47 train back to London and therefore couldn’t hear evidence after 3.25. Was such a guillotine a demonstration of good value for money?

Anyway, I would love to have shared the carriage with the Committee as they returned to London, and waited for the “What are we to make of all that?”

The objective of the sortie to Sheffield was “about trying to find out what is really happening on the ground, ..., what is going right, and what is going wrong”. What they heard were mixed messages about procurement in Sheffield; not local government in general, and not local government procurement in Sheffield but a ‘come all ye’ of anecdotes from questionable sources. For example:

• Single sourcing is leading to an item which would otherwise have cost £10 costing £20, yet no evidence to substantiate that claim was provided;
•  EU procurement rules require contracts over £250k to be advertised, yet my understanding is that the threshold for councils is actually £173,934;
•  Contracts under £20k can be awarded on the basis of three phone calls;
• “people, companies and organisations from outside the area seem to have a better opportunity of obtaining procurement contracts, mainly because they do not have any conflicts of interest or for some other reason.”

My suggestion to the Committee is, if you hear such heresy and factually flawed evidence, treat the informants other evidence with a large pinch of salt.

But the Committee are not blameless in this evidence session,