Grenfell Tower: Could procurement help reduce the current risk?

Few could fail to be affected by the tragic disaster of Grenfell Tower. Understandably there has been a clamour for a quick response to reduce the risk of a repeat, but I wonder if the potential use of procurement as a speedy risk mitigator is being overlooked.

Attention is being given to having the cladding on something like 600 tower blocks tested and fire inspections carried out.  While that will provide some comfort and be politically expedient it there may be faster ways in providing reassurances to those potentially at risk.

Let's face it for cladding to have been installed there needed to be a specification, a contractor and a completion. Would it not be possible to use make use of that trio for providing a quicker response:

1. Each landlord checks the specification for cladding to see if, with the benefit of hindsight, it satisfies today's safety requirement; (If landlords don't have the capability then perhaps some central support could be provided to QA the specification);
2. If the specification is considered 'fit for today's needs' we then ask the contractor for a written undertaking as to whether they fitted the specified cladding. Failure to give that undertaking could be place the contractor on a 'naming and shaming list' and potentially be taken into consideration in the award of future contracts. Health & Safety legislation and Contract Law could be used to address those who feel short in delivering the specification;
3. If the specification is no longer acceptable then at least we have a short list to progress for further prioritisation;
4. Where the specification is appropriate and the contractor provides an undertaking that they complied, then you can provide some reassurance to residents and move those site visits further down the queue;

If I am correct, this strategy could provide reassurance in hours rather that weeks. Document analysis and quality assurance is at its core rather than the much slower inspection and testing. Is what I propose over-simplistic or have I missed something?

I'm not suggesting there will not be a need for a comprehensive response of testing, inspections, and review of Building Regulations, but that can happen against a background of the proposed prioritisation

Of course, the finger may well be pointed at construction procurement anyway, for example, poor specifying, poor contract supervision and management are obvious potential vulnerabilities, as will be allegations of fraud and corruption!

Pirates of the Specification

Buying ships shouldn't be such a big deal if you've a legacy of being one of the great naval nations of the world; you'd have had experience of buying ships to cope with the ice of the Antarctic and the dealing with the Pirates of the Caribbean. Therefore, for many it will have come as a surprise that £1bn of warships are breaking down in the Gulf since the water is too warm, leaving crews vulnerable!!!

The contractors claim the MOD didn't tell them about that particular potential usage, even though the UK has been engaged in flighting there since 1990, if I am correct, and in truth we could go back centuries. Have the MOD locked themselves into a strategy which requires a portfolio of ships which can only be used in restricted climates?  If that was the case, the old news stories of warships being redeployed from various parts of the globe to potential conflict areas will be no more, for the simple reason they wouldn't work.

Setting that aside, now it looks as if a refit of these particular Destroyers will be necessary.  

I assume the courts will have to decide who picks up the cost but already it looks as though the contractor is trying to escape liability by resorting to the technical specification set out by the MOD - in other words Rolls Royce complied with the letter of the specification so it's not their fault: 

Are the conditions experienced in the Gulf in line with that specification? No, they’re not. So the equipment is having to operate in far more arduous conditions than were initially required (Tomas Leahy of Rolls Royce).

I assume we will hear eventually if the MOD used a solely technical specification, but this must serve as a warning to all those who do that using a solely technical specification shifts the burden of functionality to the buyer. To me there will always be a basic need for technical specifications but they need to be accompanied with functional and performance specifications; and when a service is involved, outcome specifications.  It certainly looks, at face value, as if the MOD set aside the functional and performance aspects, and, if that is the case, why?

But there's another question here, what about all the talk of supplier partnerships and innovation transfer - was that a one-way street from the MOD to the market without reciprocation? The relationship between the MOD and its strategic partners now looks as if it has suffered a major set-back and will take some time to recover.

To me there is one lesson for all procurement professionals here: never resort solely to a tec spec.

Another misreading of relative power in buyer/supplier negotiations

Once more we learn of what looks like another misreading of relative power in buyer/supplier relationships; this time M&S.

There's no need to retell the whole story which was published in today's Sunday Times, but it appears M&S, by pursing a responsible sourcing strategy, reduced its potential supply base and therefore ease of switching suppliers. Then, in response to the weakening exchange rate following the Brexit vote, refused to work with suppliers in addressing their cost increases, but instead said they were going to consolidate the supply base, therefore exerting power over suppliers yet reducing suppliers long-term 'skin in the game'. Then, facing potential loss of supplies (relative supplier power) have now had to backtrack on their earlier assertion and accept supplier price rises.

Not only has M&S lost face in this foray they have needlessly sacrificed supplier goodwill and trust, and quite possibly lost credibility in their narrow interpretation of responsible sourcing.

I do not understand why procurement strategists appear to spend insufficient time thinking through potential scenarios and likely supplier responses; they would benefit a lot from game theory by considering "how might our suppliers respond". M&S don't seem to have thought through potential outcomes prior to pursuing any of the above approaches.  'Power' appears to be viewed solely as one-way and risks dismissed.

As we start 2017 I doubt this will be the only example of misreading power in buyer/supplier relationships - why is that; why are we so poor at learning lessons for others?

It's time for a review of the impact of procurement legislation

Today The Times reported that the Ministry of Defence takes bribery and corruption very seriously and has made dozens of allegations about bribery and corruption in supply chains.   Now, I ask you, which organisation is going to admit it doesn't take bribery and corruption seriously?

However, often when I meet with 'procurement leaders' and make reference to the Modern Slavery Act, and/or the Bribery Act, I don't get the impression either of those pieces of legislation are taken that seriously at all. Indeed, I am often left with feeling nothing is really happening there.

Perhaps, as a profession, it is time to take stock and ask what difference these types of legislation actually have on the procurement community.  Are we fooling ourselves?

Surely if the profession is committed to the spirit of the legislation it would make sense to lead an impact assessment to establish 'so what?'.  Commitment to the spirit of the legislation isn't enough.  I suggest we need performance management, and yes, sanctions on those within the profession - I have to think long and hard to recall any 'naming, shaming and being struck off' - are we fooling ourselves that all is rosy.

Lagarde conviction should be a warning for all those involved in procurement governance

Today Christine Lagarde was convicted of criminal charges of negligence for failing to challenge a decision and merely rubber stamping.  Lagarde, currently the IMF chief, former French Finance Minister and ally of former UK Chancellor George Osborne in pursuit of his austerity strategy, has long been one of the most respected commentators and regularly appeared on Newsnight, for example.  She would have been an exemplar in a world when politicians are losing respect. While she will not be spending Christmas in jail, the view is that she could have been looking at one year in prison and a €13,000 fine.

This highly unusually high profile case must serve as a wake-up call to those involved in governance; rubber stamping is insufficient.  Governance is about representing the interests of the organisation and protecting it through scrutiny and asking clever questions, and dare I say, particularly those involved in investments and procurement.  The 'professional' experts should have nothing to fear in providing assurance of how they have arrived at recommendations.  The scrutiny of the 'approvers' is the last QA line of defence before committing the organisation to what could prove, in retrospect, to have been a mistake.

Here in Northern Ireland, the First Minister, Arlene Foster, is facing calls to step aside while an investigation is carried out into her involvement in the daft Renewable Heat Incentive Scheme, which provided the perverse incentive of rewarding users to over-heat their properties.  One can assume that the Lagarde outcome will stir the pot at the Northern Ireland Assembly more. Did, Foster, when she was overseeing the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, ask clever questions, did she merely rubber stamp, or ...?

I am reminded of David Steele's defence when he was challenged over some of the decisions in the Scottish Parliament building fiasco  - Ministers were kept in the dark by civil servants!  I think that escape route is unlikely to be acceptable anymore or haven't the lessons been learnt?

After years of working on governance processes and the associated risk management, I think that both Lagarde and Foster are far from alone in how they have 'exercised' governance, and I doubt the lessons will be heeded or welcomed by many.

When contract management meets prisons management.

In the face of an obvious procurement performance management crisis in UK prisons, the Prisons Minister has stated "We have robust processes in place to closely monitor and manage the performance of all contractors".  It therefore seems strange that a £200m maintenance contract has been able to take on the appearance of not being managed and it was only when prison officers refused to accept inmates, some repairs made within hours!

Robust contract management process need to be more than just a written procedure, they need to be embedded as a way of working.

To make that happen the contract needs to have explicit standards and a specification of what represents acceptable performance - it is agreement between the provider and client of what they are exchanging. Is that explicit in the prison's maintenance contract?  That statement should have been based on a risk assessment and understanding of the 'front line' - were front line staff involved in defining the standards?

There also needs to be a cascading of the contract documentation down to those who are in a position to know, on the ground, what acceptable performance means. There is little point in a contractor being criticised for poor delivery if they are actually matching what they were asked to price, that could include, for example, schedules of which repairs need to be completed within particular timescales - again risk based.  While Carillion, in this particular case, are being criticised, is the specification part of the contract actually robust?

A contract management structure needs to support the process which sets out who monitors what and the escalation approach. It also needs to have a process where and when client/contractor liaison meetings take place.  Either this was not in place or it has failed drastically for the Prisons Minister to now be meeting with Carillion's senior management to set out the improvements required.

But the Prisons Minister also needs more that a list of defaults to wave in front of Carillion, he needs to have a very clear plan of what he is going to do if Carillion don't make the improvements. Can he terminate the contract and find someone else, for example? If he makes a threat at this stage and then doesn't follow through, he'll be looking for his own 'get out of jail' card.

Procurement risk management & power at Labour Party HQ

You may recall I discussed the UK Government's Guidance Note on Procurement Boycotts some time ago - at that time I was cynical about it's impact. However, Procurement Boycott's hit the news again today - this time the decision of the Labour Party to Boycott that 'procurement old faithful' G4S.

It seems the Labour Party Conference now has a risk of being cancelled as there may not be a contractor in place to provide the required security cover. G4S' contract was cancelled due to their links with Israeli prisons. Attempts at getting others to bid have so far failed.

This is one of those examples which demonstrates so much of procurement risk management. Firstly, it was probably perceived as a Routine contract as opposed to a Bottleneck 'show stopper'. Secondly, it demonstrates the need to recognise power and dependency - Labour probably but wrongly assumed, like so many, that security contractors would love to compete for their work.  Thirdly, it demonstrates that putting in a Procurement Policy without considering its full implications may result in having to rip up the policy.  Finally, it demonstrates the need for supplier engagement when introducing 'new ways of working'.

Procurement Policy may just have moved up the agenda of the Labour Party - it certainly looks as though someone is going to have to shift.

When BREXIT becomes a reality for procurement

On the 24 April I Tweeted "What will life be like if the result of the Brexit referendum is 51% either way?".  The Referendum result is now known with just under 52% voting for a UK exit from the EU - hardly decisive, yet, it certainly looks as if the claims of the Brexiteers will now be tested. It is noteworthy though that just under 56% of those in Northern Ireland and 62% of Scots voted to remain - so we have a nation divided as well as nations divided!

Already the UK Prime Minister has handed in his notice but even in the remaining three months of his tenure he will wield little influence, after all he brought the Referendum on the UK and has failed to bring even his mates with him. His succession plan also seems to have been ripped up as Osborne also called this one wrong. Who should the EU negotiate with?

In March 2015 I advocated in Public Money and Management "that those working in public procurement policy and practice would do well to consider the 'what if' scenario if the threatened exits from the EU materialise as there would be significant repercussions ... and risk assess the implications for practice". I would be surprised but impressed if we had sight of those 'working papers'. 

But it is not only those in public sector procurement who should have been risk managing a potential exit result - in my opinion every CPO should have drafted a high-level strategy based on the vote going either way. Now those strategies need to be refreshed and risk managed on the potential speed of the exit.

Those who claimed the UK was shackled by the EU procurement rules need to start to articulate clearly what they want to have replaced and what the To-Be will look like. Then there's the range of other EU legislation which had a bearing on UK procurement - it would be useful if a comprehensive list of the existing legislation was prepared and the dialogue started on which should remain in the longer term and which should be either revised to dumped. Of course that which will be suggested for the bin will need to be risk assessed too.

I suspect for many years we will have Cameron's strategy analysed as a case study - should he have initially yielded to the self-inflicted pressure for a Referendum? Should he have negotiated a better deal with the EU as opposed to claiming success? What was wrong with his communications plan?

I also suspect there will be winners and losers in the procurement world, those who manage Brexit well will shine, those who don't may aswell pick up their coats now.

The risk of unshared service at Whitehall

Few will be surprised at the failure of the Whitehall Shared Service, set up in 2013, to deliver its anticipated savings.  I remember when first being asked to give a view on the tender document saying the major risk would be getting sufficient buy-in from the departments to deliver the benefits.  Sure enough, only two departments have now adopted the 'shared service', four others having dropped out along the way.  You can read the NAO report but, to me, for the initiative to be a success there needed to be leadership, risk management, change management, technical capability of the provider and programme management.  I'm sure the Major Projects regime will have its own view - let's face it the MPA must have to provide some accountability for delivery.

1. Leadership: who was/is leading this initiative providing a compelling agrument to ensure and the potential user departments stay the journey?
2. Risk management: How were the risks accessed and managed, particuluarly the risk of failing to deliver the business case, failure to have sufficient confidence in the new solution to shift from the old systems, failure to gain ownership of the departments, and more, to grow the number of users, failure to ensure the provider will sufficient income to 'stay the distance'?
3. Change management: I fear that like so many of these projects the emphasis will have been on the technical solution and as a result the 'people aspects' will have been sidelined - these initiatives are never just a technical solution, there will be people who need to want to shift to the new ways of working.
4. Does it work: Of course the technology has to do  what it is supposed to better than the 'old ways' but it also has to remain current and reflect the speed to innovation in technology.

Now those politically and managerially responsible need to have a response plan. Can they learn the lessons, salvage the relationships with those who have 'dropped out' and still make the investment deliver its projected benefits?  For the rest of us we can only learn.

Dominant power & lethal injection procurement

Back in 2013 I discussed the problems Texas was facing with its death penalty regime due to a supplier no longer wanting to supply. Today there are reports that there are no longer any legal supplies of the drugs at all in USA, after Pfzer, the last remaining supplier, decided to cut supply.

This is a remarkable example of how dominant power impacts on procurement.  While few would doubt the USA has massive buyer power collectively over markets, in this case, the USA have discovered that dominant power can also be with the supplier.

Like yesterday's posting, on Archaeologists, this is another clear example of a bottleneck item. It is also an interesting example of the difficulties which can be faced in finding substitutes.

For want of an archaeologist ...

I love it when I find a new example of a Bottleneck item - those purchases which are often comparatively low price but of critical importance.  Today's Times yielded one such example which I'm not sure many would have thought of: archaeologists!

UK politicians have made a lot of noise about the need for more housebuilding. In parallel, the HS2 is quite possibly the biggest, and most politically sensitive infrastructure project for some time, for example, it's 350 miles long - you can read more of my observations on its procurement here. The financial cost of each of these initiatives is enormous and logically delays will add to cost and have a negative impact on delivery of the business case.  Politicians accountable for delivery will understandably be a bit sensitive too.

However, before work can actually commence on site there is a requirement in the UK for an archaeological investigation.  The estimated demand for archaeologists means that an additional 25% of these 'Indiana Jones' types are required.

I'm sure you can see where this is going - what's the lead-time to get an archaeologist with the necessary skills trained, was the supply pipeline of archaeologists created in sufficient time, has enough attention been given to attract students to pursue archaeology, how much had been budgeted for the premium costs which may now need to be paid for this scarce resource, has the Home Office thought through the potential visa implications for non-EU citizens who may be required? You get the feel for the procurement, project and programme management risks?

Somebody tell me that this has all been previously risk assessed and mitigated. Do I sense an 'In The Thick of It' moment?  Perhaps. as they used to say of procurement, this is Archaeology's opportunity - but hopefully not at Procurement's expense.

Anti-Corruption Summit - Is Afghanistan's Procurement Strategy right for others?

Linked to today's Anti-Corruption summit in London, the Prime Minister's Office have published 'Against Corruption: A Collection of Essays.  One of the essays, by Afghanistan's President, specifically addresses procurement.

In that essay President Ghani argues that a failure of individual and institutional accountability is at the heart of corruption; that is compounded by fragmented institutions. The panacea, to Ghani, is strong political leadership:

In fragmented systems, only strong, national political leadership can tackle corruption at its roots. This is because only the top leadership can look across the different areas and ministries where corruption happens, in order to provide an effective agenda for reform. By demonstrating top commitment through positive action, even fragmented systems can build coalition with internal and external reformers.

 Ghani reports that public procurement in Afghanistan suffers from:

• bid rigging, including, bids received from non-existent companies; 
• buyers sharing cost estimates 'for a fee'; 
• conflicts of interest in the decision making process; 
• coercion of bidders to alter or withdraw competitive bids;  
• specifying for sole supply; 
• acceptance of deliveries which are not of the specified quality.

Let's be honest, these are not problems unique to Afghanistan, nor the public sector alone - they are common in many businesses throughout the world and few can be sure they are completely immune or risk free. 

The Afghan strategy to combat the above is "formation of a National Procurement Council (NPC) to review all high-value contracts and the consolidation of construction contracts through two specialised agencies."  The National Procurement Council is chaired by the President himself!  This overseeing is claimed to have saved $350m in the first year.  Ironically we are told though that punishment of those guilty of corruption in procurement has been almost negligible. 

No-one could deny that public procurement in Afghanistan has become a 'top table' issue and I congratulate the President on his commitment.  However, I do question the strategy: 

1. Responding to institutional corruption through concentrating oversight on a few at the top table, or even two 'centralised buying bodies' is well meaning but the Brazilian President's current predicament may be worth considering and learning from?  What if corruption is at the top?  Perhaps Afghanistan could consider what risk management approach is applied and how there can be independent scrutiny of 'the executive'?
2. I also think it is naive to think all procurement can be addressed or policed by 'the few'.
3. I don't actually believe fragmentation of governance is a cause, in fact, the tiered government system of the UK between Central, Devolved and local government may serve as a useful demonstration that it is not. Local democratic accountability may well provide part of the solution.
4. Ghani implies a culture change is required - how is that actually being addressed and managed?
5. Simplifying, standardising and automation of procurement processes, led by the Top, is an essential part of the solution, but that has to include clearly defined segregation of duties. That is not referred to by Ghani but perhaps is on the agenda.  
6. The procurement systems need to be fit for purpose, make compliance easy and abuse hard - better use of eProcurement tools can spread the load and enable the NPC to focus where it is necessary.
7. I didn't see any mention in the essay of the performance management structure, given that personal accountability is identified as part of the solution. I think that should be addressed otherwise rhetoric and an essay will be the only legacy.
8. Ghani has implied that the consequences of being caught need to be addressed; I would argue that unless the risks, penalties and probability of being caught outweigh the potential rewards of fraud, bribery and corruption, the Afghan strategy is merely chasing the wind and unlikely to succeed.

I am genuinely impressed that Ghani has been prepared to lead the reform of procurement in Afghanistan, and I wish him well, I look forward to hearing of progress in a few years time. Hold on, what are the plans to review the effectiveness of his strategy?

Tales of the unexpected, Harmeston & procurement leadership lessons

I do not recall when the professional credibility of a CPO has received as much attention as that of Kath Karmeston (for example,  The Guardian, FT,  and The Times).  Harmeston already had a significant profile, largely through the reputation she gained as Royal Mail's CPO, before moving to the Co-op.  At the Co-op she became responsible for cutting the costs of the >£1bn spent on 'goods not for resale', and The Times claims she was paid £357k a year for that!

However, after a remarkably short stay, say ten weeks, Harmeston and the Co-op parted company. Harmeston decided to pursue a claim of £5.2m for unfair dismissal (I've no idea how that figure was calculated and some would say it was an unachievable negotiating position). Whether intended or not, Harmeston brought the spotlight on herself through the decision to go to the tribunal. You can read the Co-operatives version of the Tribunal here.  Now after almost two months of waiting for an answer, it is reported she has failed in her claim against the Co-op for unfair dismissal.

I am not competent to comment on the legal aspects, and feel a slight discomfort intruding on private grief, but I can have an opinion on some of the alleged practice reported in press - let's remember this blogpost is based on reported evidence and some of the evidence was contested.  Much of evidence struck me as irrelevant to the unfair dismissal case but relevant to the profession and those who would hope to bring about procurement change - it's those areas I discuss below.

We are told Harmeston believed she had uncovered a lack of procurement policy compliance; 70% of the budget. Understanding the extent of non-complaint spend is certainly a good starting position for improvement - understanding 'why' and what to do about it would be an even better position. The CEO though claimed the issues raised by Kath were already known about and Kath had previously been briefed on them. It is always dangerous to claim the glory for uncovering something when others say you didn't - that applies just as much to claiming savings in isolation of the budget-holder's contribution. 

Nevertheless, when the Co-op's head of group risk probed Kath, he concluded that the CPO didn't know the details of the procurement policy. Now given that she was only in post ten weeks, it could be argued that was understandable. What strikes me as unacceptable though was his assertion:

Policy process and governance she defaulted to [her deputy] because she felt it was beneath her. 

Anyway, that was made worse by, Paula Keegan, the former group chief strategy officer's opinion that Harmeston knowingly chose to break the Co-op's procurement policy herself.

I cannot think of any situation when procurement governance should not be a primary concern when seeking to bring about procurement change, indeed even setting the example of compliance.

Perhaps you can already sense the loneliness of the CPO's journey. To me, when you want to bring about procurement change you also need a coalition of allies - the CEO, head of group risk and group chief strategy officer would be useful allies but Kath failed to gain their ownership.

Nevertheless,

In the firing line for buying bendy rifles?

If this were the 1st April I would have thought what follows was an April Fool, but since it is early March we will have to take reports that the Paris police have bought guns which don't shoot straight at face value.

We are led to believe the German army had concerns about Heckler & Koch G36 assault rifles and their unreliable aim in temperatures over 23C - supposedly 50cm off target at a range of 200m when the temperature is 30C!  As a result, the German army has embarked upon a replacement plan over the next three years.

However, the French appear to have been unaware of, or ignored, the German concerns and have just bought 204 of the same rifles as a part of a €17m investment. To make matters worse, it is also said that the French have insufficient shooting ranges where the rifles can be used.

So, some obvious questions:

1. Were the rifles purchased by brand or performance specification? A performance specification may provide the French with some reassurance?
2. Is a high degree of accuracy actually required by the French? If not, well perhaps the lack of accuracy isn't an issue unless you're an innocent bystander of course.
3. Were the rifles bought without considering the potential range of temperatures in which a high-degree of accuracy would be required? It certainly looks as though a warm day in Paris may cause problems and heaven only knows what the consequences of the searing temperatures of Syria would be.
4. Did the French reduce their exposure to risk by discussing their needs with other users to learn from their experience? If they were aware of the German concerns perhaps they were able to negotiate a particularly good deal to offset the lack of function.
5. Have the French reduced their risk of a product not fit for purpose by testing a representative sample in the full range of possible scenarios of usage? Maybe the test will provide an opportunity to escape from the deal.
6. Did the French consider the additional requirements of practice ranges when committing the purchase? Sometimes buyers forget the additional costs incurred in the pursuit of lowest price.

Seems a pity that what appears to have been a rushed procurement with good intentions may be a case of flawed procurement - a faux pas.

CIPS Cyber Security for Procurement Professionals - a useful eLearning tool.

I have just become aware that CIPS released a free eLearning course 'Cyber Security for Procurement Professionals'  which was developed with the UK Government.

There are six modules and it is available free of charge regardless of whether or not you are a CIPS member.  The suggested time for completing the eLearning is 75' but you will need longer if you follow the various links.

To me the real value is in Module 3; the others are pretty generic cyber security awareness raising, while Model 3 provides really useful specific advice on what the procurement professional should do, for example, including the need for certifications in bids.  I think it also implies the need to give some thought to the implications of cyber security within S2P processes.

On the downside, there is some infuriating background music - turn it off. The 'Knowledge Check' questions are the end of each module are so basic they are of questionable value. Disappointingly, I found when I followed some of the early document links I ended up having to completely restart the tool as opposed to picking up where I left off.

Nevertheless, I think this is a useful CIPS offer and would recommend it be included as a 'must do annually'.  I wonder why it is not behind CIPS member only firewall?

Junior Doctors, the EU Referendum and procurement change management lessons

I honestly don't know who is right in the current NHS change management crisis with the Junior Doctors. Imposing the new contracts can only be viewed as a failure but it is also a symptom of the bigger failure of change management or mis-management. I suppose there are questions as to whether imposing contracts is even legal; like many of you, I have been the victim of having changed employment and pension contracts imposed on me - that did not make me feel good. There is of course no doubt that the NHS is in a crisis and the resolution of the Junior Doctors issue will set a precedent for future negotiations way beyond those with the Junior Doctors.

There is also a precedent for the current chaos - remember the communications debacle relating to care.data. The system was to improve service but the communications management was lousy.

The reason why I do not know whether Hunt or the Junior Doctors are right is very similar to the care.data debacle - the NHS communications setting out the current 'As-Is' and the future 'To-Be' has been abysmal. Those 'anti-change' have usefully played on emotion and fear. They have also managed to successfully infiltrate almost every one of the discussions on BBC Question Time for some weeks - the equivalent of the Greek Agora, the Roman Forum, and the works' canteen - the dessenters voice is very definitely the clearest and the loudest.  I ask myself why the NHS have not set out, in very simplistic terms, their case for change, perhaps on a webpage, a full page advertorial, or even a televised debate - that also needs to debunk the supposed myths of the BMA.  If that happened I could make an informed decision. If they really wanted to be aggressive they could also 'un-deify' the Junior Doctors - easy enough if you started to discuss the various NHS failures and how they could be linked to the problems the new contracts will overcome.

Of course the NHS' 'Junior Doctors' communications fiasco are only a warm-up for the EU debate - we can expect emotion and fear to dominate. We can expect communications to be poor - they already are.

So what about lessons for procurement? Well, if you want to bring about procurement change, the Junior Doctors crisis may serve as a useful warning:

1. Make clear, again, and again, and again, what the benefits of the 'To-Be' and how they address the problems of the 'As-Is';
2. Understand the negotiating power of those involved;
3. Understand the fears of those who will and could be impacted;
4. Address head-on the criticisms of the dessenters - some of their concerns will be justified, some will be nonsense, and some just scaremongering;
5. Remember that new systems and processes are not inanimate, they are concerned with people and it is people who will determine the effectiveness of the outcome;
6. Bring people with you, including those right on the periphery.

Have the NAO got it wrong on gifts & hospitality?

I read the National Audit Office report on the 'Investigation into the acceptance of gifts and hospitality' with interest but have to say I am mystified. While the EU and United Nations are against the receiving of gifts within a procurement context, the NAO appear to have come to a view that:

While barring UK officials from accepting gifts and hospitality is an option, it would run the risk of hampering the legitimate activities of the departments and officials, including engaging with stakeholders.

How could the refusal of a gift hamper (excuse the pun) business? I am also mystified at the lack of explicit recommendations.

Hospitality and gifts are only targeted at those who are likely to have influence over a decision, and there should be no 'ifs' or 'buts', they are offered to distort decision-making. Of course, the NAO have referred to avoiding perceived conflicts of interest - sorry perception of hampering business is unavoidable when gifts and hospitality are received in the procurement process.

Let's also remember that any gift or hospitality offered is not free from cost - that cost has to be recouped from somewhere and in all probability is an overhead cost included in all public sector contracts.

So what were the examples of gifts received:

These included: tickets to professional sports and cultural events, sometimes accompanied by a spouse and/or children; bottles of champagne; wine for a team’s Christmas lunch; iPads; Fortnum & Mason hamper, a painting valued at £300.

That list is of course constrained by the fact that the systems for recording gifts are not robust and not adhered to anyway.

I didn't pick up anything which specifically addressed staff involved in procurement, but let's remember that if they are MCIPS/FCIPS the CIPS Code of Conduct applies.

Regardless, I think the NAO have missed a mark on this one, a robust approach to the acceptance of gifts and hospitality is not just about the perception of conflicts of interest, it is about protecting staff from potential allegations of bribery and corruption - it should not only be a risk management issue but a health and safety issue too.

Learning from the failed procurement strategy of reforming legal services procurement

Finally the government has faced the reality that success was unlikely in the dispute with the legal profession and have aborted their plan to cut layers legal fees. I have discussed this daft procurement strategy for years now and why it was unlikely to be successful.

Face-saving is of course required and it was probably easier for Gove to draw a line under this than his predecessor, but let's pick up a few lessons:

1. Pick your fights carefully - the legal profession is an oligopoly who understand the law, relative power and dependency. Without a means of redressing that imbalance, failure could be predicted;
2. If you are going to consult with the market, listen. While there were great promises of consulting with the legal profession, the failure to take on board the messages of the market did not appear to be listened to.  Making a sham of market consultation ultimately reduces confidence and trust in the process;
3. 'Cutting and pasting' one type of sourcing strategy to another category is just stupid - larger contracts and a lowest price pursuit may make sense in some situations but definitely not all;
4. Procurement risk assessments are important - it would be great to hear how the MoJ identified and planned to mitigate all the risks associated with this procurement strategy and how political and reputational risk were being mitigated?

It would be really interesting to carry out an impact assessment of the UK government procurement strategy over the last 10 years, say, and establish which worked and why; having said that, it may well be that is a comparatively short list compared to those which didn't work.

A New Year procurement lesson from Rodin and the Honore of Balzac

Some time ago I discussed the story behind one of Rodin's sculptures, the Burghers of Calais, and its relevance to procurement; this time I want to discuss the actual procurement of a different one, namely, the sculpture of Balzac, the novelist who lived from 1799 until 1850.  

Rodin was commissioned by Societe des Gens de Lettres in 1891. Rodin spent seven years on the work, seeking to understand the author's life, arranging for models to pose and actually ordering clothes to Balzac's measurements. He eventually clothed the sculpture in a dressing gown depicting Balzac's dress sense when writing. Worse, Rodin chose to present the sculpture as a persona as opposed to a true likeness. The client was unaware of this intention and when a plaster model was presented to them in 1898 they were furious and refused to pay.

Rodin kept the sculpture but it was not cast in Bronze until 22 years after his death.  (You can now see the finished work and the Burghers of Calais in the Rodin Museum in Paris.)

Few would doubt Rodin's capability and capacity to satisfy the client, that's not where the commission went wrong. So, as we approach the procurements of 2016, the lesson is clear: make sure you specify clearly what you want and any constraints you place on the provider. If your commission can be managed in stages with sign-offs, make sure you set out what those stages are and also how you have the right of exit.

Rodin's sculpture of Balzac was not to everyones taste and indeed neither the buyer nor the seller ended up happy; pity they hadn't given more thought to the procurement process.

Santa's procurement hoverboard hell or heaven?

Forget Santa, this could be another bad news day for the procurement profession, given that Amazon have advised customers they should throwaway hoverboards they have purchased due to safety concerns.

Behind the need for refunds will be a calling to account for those who handled the sourcing of the hoverboards and how so many have failed to meet UK, and I assume EU, safety standards. I can visualise the customer helplines of many large retailers being inundated with calls from customers looking for assurances that their hoverboards meet safety standards. Similar calls have probably already been made by CEO's and Marketing Directors!

In those situations Procurement is vulnerable if not culpable. This is an opportunity and a risk for Procurement.

1. If Procurement were involved but the hoverboards their organisation have on the market are safe, then they need to 'strike while the iron is hot', and get the CEO seizing the opportunity to market the company as a responsible retailer while others have been seen to fail; 
2. If Procurement were not involved in the sourcing then the case is made for future involvement and the application of procurement risk management tools, including process improvements;
3. Sadly, if Procurement were involved and the hoverboards now need to be recalled - I hope they believe in Santa too!