Plot gets thicker on police procurement

On Tuesday I discussed potential procurement corruption in the award of a contract for vehicles with the Police Service of Northern Ireland.  Now it looks as though the investigation has been extended to another contract and spread and led to the suspension of West Yorkshire"s Chief Constable. 

Those leading the investigation need to recognise that the reputation of the police in the UK is at the present quite low. They also need to avoid falling into the trap of not being seen to be doing the right thing or providing an easy exit for those implicated.

However, if it is subsequently established that there has been procurement bribery, fraud and corruption, it will be most unlikely that it will be isolated to just vehicle contracts.  The investigation will need to review:

1. The procurement governance structure;
2. Which other areas of spend the culprits have been involved with and how vulnerable those areas were to abuse;
3. Which other public sector organisations have been supplied by the supplier/s involved - it is unlikely that the supplier only found one area of vulnerability;
4. Consider the history of dealing with the supplier/s involved and how long the abuse has been going on;
5. Which other police forces, and indeed public sector organisations, may have been following the same 'failed' preventative systems;
6. etc..

There also needs to be a due diligence of the procurement processes to establish vulnerability to procurement fraud, bribery and corruption. The Bribery Act requires organisations to put in place processes to prevent bribery anyway.

But if it is subsequently proved that contracts have been wrongly awarded as a result of corruption other relevant issues may arise. For example, 

1. Assuming the contracts were awarded through the Public Contracts Regulations, surely there must have been a breach of those laws?
2. What about the suppliers who would have been awarded the contracts had there not been corruption? Would those potential suppliers not be entitled to compensation for loss of profits? That would open a major can of worms as all those award evaluations would potentially be exposed to scrutiny and who knows how robust they would have been.

What will the next instalment be?

Not a good day for IT procurement strategy news

Not a good day for public procurement IT stories: two embarassing stories.  One looks like a procurement risk management and strategy issue linked with implementing a policy, regardless of understanding the risks; the second, concerns procurement project leadership credibility.


The Financial Times suggests the the Cabinet Office strategy of moving from big IT companies may have compromised effective delivery, in that the consortium of SMEs used as a preferred strategy may have stretched capability and led to service failures. 'Shambolic' is the term used!  While there are calls for delaying further rollout until lessons are learnt, is it not obvious that a phased rollout should have started with small departments should have been managed by the client with a watchful eye. Equally, while I can understand the sentiment of the policy, why on earth were ministers not aware of the risks, or were they?

The second story, this time in The Times, concerns the allocation of responsoibility for the Met's 'Total Technology' modernisation programme. It appears that one of those responsible for managing the programme brings with him unfortunate baggage of a past IT failure which cost £15m. While Grant Thornton found the oversight of the failed project in Surrey was 'not fit for purpose' it seems Rowley, who is now leading 'Total Technology', doesn't recognise that as relating to his leadership. Failure to recognise the need to learn lessons isn't a good place to be in - Mr Rowley and the Met need to understand what went wrong at Surrey and how those lessons will be applied in the future. As it is, Rowley's ability to gain the confidence of the programme team may already have compromised success. It is not a good omen.

So some key messages:

1. A policy needs to be risk assessed and then implementation managed;
2. If the decision is made to pursue a policy and strategy which is high risk it is best have a phased implementation starting with lower risk areas;
3. Where a project has failed due to leadership which is 'not fit for purpose' understand the reasons behind that statement, acknowledge the failure if necessary, and be clear how the lessons learnt with be applied;
4. Do expect a failed leader to deliver better leadership on a bigger programme without ensuring a strong governance structure is in place.

The arresting case of police vehicles and procurement

The UK fight on procurement fraud, bribery and corruption moved up a notch today following the arrest of six involved in the award of contracts for police vehicles in Northern Ireland. As part of the investigation the police have also seized computers.

It is interesting that the PSNI have made reference to trying to establish whether there has been a breach of their Code of Ethics. of course it is good that they have a Code of Ethics, but sometimes I wonder what purpose such a Code has if it is not widely communicated and, dare I say, 'policed'.

As a profession we need to understand what went awry with this procurement. We need to understand the lessons and we need to take those lessons home to our own organisatons. So let's hope that the findings of the investigation are shared.

If it is subsequently proved that there has been a breach of the PSNI Code and we have a case of procurement bribery, and potentially fraud and corruption, surely the case cannot be dealt with under the Code but needs to be dealt with under the Bribery Act - who would bring forward such a case?

Then again will PSNI be subject to the strict liability of the Bribery Act for failing to put in place measures to prevent bribery?

Then of course we have to see how CIPS will react if any subsequently found to be guilty turn out to be CIPS members. Will they be subject to CIPS discipline? If that is the case CIPS will be able to use that as a warning to its membership around the globe.

I will watch this case with interst - it has the potential of a precedent for the Act and CIPS.

PS you may find my related paper published in EDPACS, which can be downloaded here of interest.

PSNI dysfunctional procurement strategy: A case study or 'who done it' mystery?

Two years ago I discussed the PSNI's procurement of temporary staff, many of whom had just retired from jobs in the same organisation. This week the Northern Ireland Assembly's PAC published its inquiry report - ten recommendations of which seven relate to procurement. The 'case' should be of interest to all those organisations which make use of Agency staff. 

Those with an interest in procurement strategy as opposed to public policy could look at the Inquiry slightly differently. Is this one of the few situations where there is evidence of a procurement approach actually working in opposition to the intended outcome of the legislation? Cynically, was a procurement approach requested which would satisfy the PSNI's (Police Service of Northern Ireland) objective of 'getting round' the need for changing the personnel? Put slightly differently, was this an 'intended strategy' to match objectives set for procurement or an example of poor procurement?

First, some background. The transformation of the make-up of the police was one of the core commitments of the Good Friday (Northern Ireland Peace) Agreement. Basically there was a desire to have a smaller police service (a peace dividend) and more balance in the mix of Protestant/Roman Catholic police officers. Former RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary - the old police service) officers were given the option of early retirement while a parallel recruitment campaign was put in place to balance the make-up of the new PSNI ). But the procurement approach resulted in more than 1,000 retired RUC officers, 19% of those who took early retirement, being brought back as agency workers to the new PSNI. £106m was spent between 2004 and 2012 on these Agency staff who had just left the RUC. Had those offices been reemployed directly by PSNI they would have had to repay their severance lump sum, which was not the case if they were hired as Agency staff.

Yet again, there was a lack of competitive tendering (you may also find Peter Smith's post today on a similar issue at MOD of interest). The service delivery commenced in 2002 but the competitive tendering was only in 2008. There had been a legacy contract in place for permanent staff which had a throughput of £2m per year, but a variation on that contract to include 'temps' led to a spend of £44m over four years.

Allegations of procurement fraud at Police Federation have lessons for all

Confidence in the police is probably at an all time low as a result of Plebgate, behaviour of undercover officers, hidden union bank accounts, Hillsborough, 'stop and search', and the failure to get any form of closure for the Lawrence family. The last thing the 'Peeler's Union' want is more damage to its reputation through a scandal of questionable procurement practices. Yet, 'Fraud squad investigates police union boss over charity deal' screamed out of today's Sunday Times.

Those implicated claim to be innocent yet they will now be paying a high personal price, whether or not the allegations are proved.

There is little doubt there was a lack of good judgement by those concerned. I don't think that lack of good judgement is solely with the specific individuals under investigation, I think a lack of good judgement was exhibited by all those concerned with the oversight of the Federation. They could have stopped the 'questionable' procurement - isn't that what oversight is supposed to include? It is my interpretation of the Bribery Act that they also failed to put in place processes to prevent bribery in procurement - had they done so, there wouldn't have been the opportunity to engage in the 'questionable' activities.

A QC representing the individual under the spotlight, acknowledges that appropriate procedures hadn't been followed. Contracts were rushed through in the absence of competition and awarded to friends who appear to have charged excessive fees. Advice from the charity's lawyer and auditor was ignored. There was also an absence of due diligence in the award.

This is a complete and utter mess yet I think it is far from unique. I believe too many organisations needlessly leave themselves and their staff open to allegations of impropriety, partly believing it will never happen to them, partly through complacency, partly through naivety.

How vulnerable is your organisation? How vulnerable are you?

Police procurement on the line

There's something very odd about a room where the most common item of clothing worn appears to be a white shirt and the main subject of discussion is how difficult it is to buy white shirts.

Yes, that's what the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee seemed to focus on at its meeting on 5 June when the subject was really Police Procurement.

However, this evidence session should, in my mind, be included within the Public Administration Select Committee's Inquiry into Public Procurement. The evidence had a much more realistic assessment of the difficulties associated with centralisation.

The Committee started with a reality check: why, when Gershon, in 2004, highlighted the need for a 'uniform' approach to buying white shirts for the 43 police forces,  has such a seemingly simple aspiration proved so difficult to implement? Yet, that's the question which needs an unequivocal answer to, and plan to address, before 'the grand collaborative public procurement vision' should be embarked upon.

Theoretically, the silver bullet has been found for the police in the form of the Procurement Hub. It appears the aspiration was that there would have been 100% sign-up to the Hub last year, yet so far only 2%, yes, TWO PERCENT has been reached. The new aspiration is that 80% will be achieved by the end of the current parliament. Asked, what milestone has been set for 12 months time on the journey from 2% to 80%, there was a sense of embarrassment - that question seemed to take the Permanent Secretary by surprise! It does make you question if there is the least likelihood of the 'stretch target' being achieved.


What are the problems with bringing about increased ownership of the Procurement Hub? Answer:

• Cultural issues;
• Changes in processes; and
• Resistance to change.

But hold on a second, the Procurement Hub will not standardise on one uniform white shirt, or one supplier, it's a collaborative 'framework'. Sounds a bit like legalising 'pick 'n' mix' as opposed to Gershon's vision.

Policing police procurement: Suggested questions for Home Affairs Select Committee

Scrutiny of public procurement is a good thing but it also needs to be informed and pragmatic. I'm not aware of any impact assessment having been carried out on the required publication of local government expenditure, but it appears far from achieving its original objective cost effectively. We now have Police and Crime Commissioners, it will interesting to see how they address procurement.


However, Tuesday 27th will bring the Metropolitan Police procurement spend of £35bn under the scrutiny of the Home Affairs Select Committee.

Unless care is taken, there is a real danger of the Committee diverting its focus to what's been bought rather than was it bought well. Looking in the rear view mirror trying to understand why £500k is spent clearing horse manure may well set the pulses racing but this shouldn't be a version of scrutinising MPs expenses but something fundamentally different.

In an earlier blog I suggested questions the Home Affairs Select Committee might ask in its inquiry into the Olympics Security debacle. I suspect they missed that blog. Nevertheless, in the spirit of citizen participation (and also helping those in the Met prepare), I would suggest MPs focus on the following:

You've got to accentuate the positive,

Eliminate the negative,

Latch on to the affirmative,

Don't mess with Mr In-Between. 

I tweeted recently to that effect: 'Student loans misunderstood, Health reforms misunderstood, DWP reforms misundertood: Dave and the Commotions, 'Please don't let me be misunderstood''.

Communication misunderstandings aren't unique to public policy reform, they are also a frequent procurement weakness; the procurement 'end' appears to be misunderstood.  An example was provided as recently as 2 March with the furore over the supposed 'police privatisation'. The only message which appeared to have been communicated was the 'negative'.  Why was there such a complete lack of confidence in the affirmative that the procurement could deliver a better outcome for citizens even though so much appears to have been contracted in the past? Highly respected procurement commentator, Peter Smith, even went so far as to refer to it as an example of 'stupid sourcing'  While I largely agree with Peter, in terms of a questionable sourcing strategy but the stupidest aspect is the associated communications strategy.

A lot of my blogs ask the simple question, 'Did the procurement deliver the anticipated results?'  I have argued that effective political leadership, scrutiny and use of 'fearless' gateway reviews all have a contribution to effective procurement outcomes - they certainly would have helped with the police procurement debacle.  But these are concerned with the procurement 'means' as opposed to the procurement 'end'.  The achievement of the outcome sometimes gets lost in the bureaucratic process or indeed in debating the process.

Yet I have also argued that suggesting some ends can be met when the process constrains that is also political folly.

Nevertheless, too many times investment just hasn't delivered what it was supposed to - that epitomises ineffective procurement;

The curious case of the procurement of blue light temporary staff

PSNI are the subject of an investigation on re-hiring former officers as temps. Estimates of spend vary but somewhere between £45m and £60m is reported to have been spent over five years. That's slightly more than the response given to a FoI request in 2009 which stated an estimated value was £5m (per year).  

Three quarters of those hired are former police officers who were recipients of redundancy payments. That's 300 staff. 

You may ask, 'why were they made redundant in the first place - what was the desired outcome?' The redundancies were the result of the Patten Recommendations to transform the former RUC into a new PSNI. Critics could argue that aspiration has not been achieved. Supporters could say there was a need to ensure business continuity and the terrorist threat had not gone away.

In addition, it was a condition of the redundancy scheme that if those made redundant were re-hired as police officers there would be a repayment of the redundancy payments. Was the contract designed to circumnavigate that requirement since the stipulation doesn't apply if those re-engaged are civilians; even, it seems, if they are carrying out broadly similar roles.  Is this what is meant by the private sector taking up the slack from public sector redundancies?

If the intention was to re-engage as civilians, then the investigation needs to go beyond one contract into the whole category.  Up until now no one has mentioned the contract for Outplacement Services.  If you are fortunate enough to be unfamiliar with this service, it is a bit like a JobCentre Plus advisor which is supposed to help those made redundant adjust, and get back into employment. My experience of it was that it was a smoke and mirrors service which should have been paid by results.  But if they were paid by results, I don't think they would exist and a grant to the Samaritans may be better use of public money - I may save that argument for another day.  Nevertheless, how much was that contract worth and was its purpose merely cosmetic if a revolving door would have sufficed?

Now we face an interesting scenario which may resonate with others.  

How does this sit with