Songs of Praise procurement and avoiding unnecessary discord

Outsourcing has now hit the religious broadcasting arm of the BBC and not everyone is singing a happy song.

Some time ago we discussed the BBC's change of weather forecasting provider and the storm of criticism that brought criticism based on whether a non-UK provider could be up to the mark - let's remember that the BBC didn't produce the weather forecasting, merely the transmission of it.

Now the BBC has exposed the production of its flagship 'Songs of Praise' programme to competition, and as a result, it will be outsourced. There does not appear to be any suggestion that the Christian orientated programme will be produced by heretics. No, only that it will not be produced in-house.

Bectu, the union, are "[demanding] better transparency over how this happened"; others fear the loss of specialist expertise in worship broadcasting.

These concerns suggest that perhaps there was a lack of engagement with key stakeholders in the procurement process, and if that was the case, I think that was a mistake. Songs of Praise has built up a strong brand and loyal following since 1961, tampering with that could have been expected to have encountered resistance.

The BBC would be in a stronger position to address criticisms if it had:

• Agreed with the key Church representatives the outcomes to be delivered from Songs of Praise in the future and how it could be improved;
• Discussed with Bectu how best to deliver the desired outcomes in the future and provided some opportunity for the in-house provider to match those expectations within an agreed reasonable time;
• Included Church representatives in the development of its sourcing strategy, development of its award criteria, and tender evaluation;
• Consulted with Bectu on its proposed sourcing strategy and evaluation model;
• Thoroughly debriefed all the bidders and Bectu on the outcome of the tendering process.

Big commissioning changes need to be supported by a change management plan if you want harmony at the end.

The risk of unshared service at Whitehall

Few will be surprised at the failure of the Whitehall Shared Service, set up in 2013, to deliver its anticipated savings.  I remember when first being asked to give a view on the tender document saying the major risk would be getting sufficient buy-in from the departments to deliver the benefits.  Sure enough, only two departments have now adopted the 'shared service', four others having dropped out along the way.  You can read the NAO report but, to me, for the initiative to be a success there needed to be leadership, risk management, change management, technical capability of the provider and programme management.  I'm sure the Major Projects regime will have its own view - let's face it the MPA must have to provide some accountability for delivery.

1. Leadership: who was/is leading this initiative providing a compelling agrument to ensure and the potential user departments stay the journey?
2. Risk management: How were the risks accessed and managed, particuluarly the risk of failing to deliver the business case, failure to have sufficient confidence in the new solution to shift from the old systems, failure to gain ownership of the departments, and more, to grow the number of users, failure to ensure the provider will sufficient income to 'stay the distance'?
3. Change management: I fear that like so many of these projects the emphasis will have been on the technical solution and as a result the 'people aspects' will have been sidelined - these initiatives are never just a technical solution, there will be people who need to want to shift to the new ways of working.
4. Does it work: Of course the technology has to do  what it is supposed to better than the 'old ways' but it also has to remain current and reflect the speed to innovation in technology.

Now those politically and managerially responsible need to have a response plan. Can they learn the lessons, salvage the relationships with those who have 'dropped out' and still make the investment deliver its projected benefits?  For the rest of us we can only learn.

Anti-Corruption Summit - Is Afghanistan's Procurement Strategy right for others?

Linked to today's Anti-Corruption summit in London, the Prime Minister's Office have published 'Against Corruption: A Collection of Essays.  One of the essays, by Afghanistan's President, specifically addresses procurement.

In that essay President Ghani argues that a failure of individual and institutional accountability is at the heart of corruption; that is compounded by fragmented institutions. The panacea, to Ghani, is strong political leadership:

In fragmented systems, only strong, national political leadership can tackle corruption at its roots. This is because only the top leadership can look across the different areas and ministries where corruption happens, in order to provide an effective agenda for reform. By demonstrating top commitment through positive action, even fragmented systems can build coalition with internal and external reformers.

 Ghani reports that public procurement in Afghanistan suffers from:

• bid rigging, including, bids received from non-existent companies; 
• buyers sharing cost estimates 'for a fee'; 
• conflicts of interest in the decision making process; 
• coercion of bidders to alter or withdraw competitive bids;  
• specifying for sole supply; 
• acceptance of deliveries which are not of the specified quality.

Let's be honest, these are not problems unique to Afghanistan, nor the public sector alone - they are common in many businesses throughout the world and few can be sure they are completely immune or risk free. 

The Afghan strategy to combat the above is "formation of a National Procurement Council (NPC) to review all high-value contracts and the consolidation of construction contracts through two specialised agencies."  The National Procurement Council is chaired by the President himself!  This overseeing is claimed to have saved $350m in the first year.  Ironically we are told though that punishment of those guilty of corruption in procurement has been almost negligible. 

No-one could deny that public procurement in Afghanistan has become a 'top table' issue and I congratulate the President on his commitment.  However, I do question the strategy: 

1. Responding to institutional corruption through concentrating oversight on a few at the top table, or even two 'centralised buying bodies' is well meaning but the Brazilian President's current predicament may be worth considering and learning from?  What if corruption is at the top?  Perhaps Afghanistan could consider what risk management approach is applied and how there can be independent scrutiny of 'the executive'?
2. I also think it is naive to think all procurement can be addressed or policed by 'the few'.
3. I don't actually believe fragmentation of governance is a cause, in fact, the tiered government system of the UK between Central, Devolved and local government may serve as a useful demonstration that it is not. Local democratic accountability may well provide part of the solution.
4. Ghani implies a culture change is required - how is that actually being addressed and managed?
5. Simplifying, standardising and automation of procurement processes, led by the Top, is an essential part of the solution, but that has to include clearly defined segregation of duties. That is not referred to by Ghani but perhaps is on the agenda.  
6. The procurement systems need to be fit for purpose, make compliance easy and abuse hard - better use of eProcurement tools can spread the load and enable the NPC to focus where it is necessary.
7. I didn't see any mention in the essay of the performance management structure, given that personal accountability is identified as part of the solution. I think that should be addressed otherwise rhetoric and an essay will be the only legacy.
8. Ghani has implied that the consequences of being caught need to be addressed; I would argue that unless the risks, penalties and probability of being caught outweigh the potential rewards of fraud, bribery and corruption, the Afghan strategy is merely chasing the wind and unlikely to succeed.

I am genuinely impressed that Ghani has been prepared to lead the reform of procurement in Afghanistan, and I wish him well, I look forward to hearing of progress in a few years time. Hold on, what are the plans to review the effectiveness of his strategy?

Tales of the unexpected, Harmeston & procurement leadership lessons

I do not recall when the professional credibility of a CPO has received as much attention as that of Kath Karmeston (for example,  The Guardian, FT,  and The Times).  Harmeston already had a significant profile, largely through the reputation she gained as Royal Mail's CPO, before moving to the Co-op.  At the Co-op she became responsible for cutting the costs of the >£1bn spent on 'goods not for resale', and The Times claims she was paid £357k a year for that!

However, after a remarkably short stay, say ten weeks, Harmeston and the Co-op parted company. Harmeston decided to pursue a claim of £5.2m for unfair dismissal (I've no idea how that figure was calculated and some would say it was an unachievable negotiating position). Whether intended or not, Harmeston brought the spotlight on herself through the decision to go to the tribunal. You can read the Co-operatives version of the Tribunal here.  Now after almost two months of waiting for an answer, it is reported she has failed in her claim against the Co-op for unfair dismissal.

I am not competent to comment on the legal aspects, and feel a slight discomfort intruding on private grief, but I can have an opinion on some of the alleged practice reported in press - let's remember this blogpost is based on reported evidence and some of the evidence was contested.  Much of evidence struck me as irrelevant to the unfair dismissal case but relevant to the profession and those who would hope to bring about procurement change - it's those areas I discuss below.

We are told Harmeston believed she had uncovered a lack of procurement policy compliance; 70% of the budget. Understanding the extent of non-complaint spend is certainly a good starting position for improvement - understanding 'why' and what to do about it would be an even better position. The CEO though claimed the issues raised by Kath were already known about and Kath had previously been briefed on them. It is always dangerous to claim the glory for uncovering something when others say you didn't - that applies just as much to claiming savings in isolation of the budget-holder's contribution. 

Nevertheless, when the Co-op's head of group risk probed Kath, he concluded that the CPO didn't know the details of the procurement policy. Now given that she was only in post ten weeks, it could be argued that was understandable. What strikes me as unacceptable though was his assertion:

Policy process and governance she defaulted to [her deputy] because she felt it was beneath her. 

Anyway, that was made worse by, Paula Keegan, the former group chief strategy officer's opinion that Harmeston knowingly chose to break the Co-op's procurement policy herself.

I cannot think of any situation when procurement governance should not be a primary concern when seeking to bring about procurement change, indeed even setting the example of compliance.

Perhaps you can already sense the loneliness of the CPO's journey. To me, when you want to bring about procurement change you also need a coalition of allies - the CEO, head of group risk and group chief strategy officer would be useful allies but Kath failed to gain their ownership.

Nevertheless,

Up on Cloud 9 with the Reform report '(Back to) the Future of public procurement'

I wearily plodded through Reform's report 'Cloud 9: The future of public procurement'. To be honest I think the highlight for me was making me think why on earth Estonia and South Korea were identified as exemplary benchmarks. I was about to compare the respective structures of devolved government and range of responsibilities and what they buy with that of the UK, and even the baseline from which their savings were achieved. Thankfully I stopped.

Sadly, the Reform report really doesn't tell us anything we didn't already know, and have known for at least 20 years.  Yes, we have heard over and over again that skills need to be improved, the benefits of embracing eProcurement, the need for better use of procurement data, a better attitude towards risk, etc, etc.. I could see nothing new there I'm afraid.

Indeed if we go back to the evidence given three years ago, by the then chief honchos of Government Procurement, to the Public Administration Select Committee (you can see an example of my posts at that time here) the mantra used in that evidence was that all these panacea were "Work in Progress".

What the Reform report doesn't tell us, which may help, is how did Estonia and South Korea bring about the change, assuming they did, which seems so illusive to the reform of UK public procurement. Do they hold individuals accountable for the bringing about change as opposed to just accepting "It's a work in progress"?

It would certainly be interesting to hear how the Reform report is viewed by the PASC and whether it acts as a catalyst to review progress since their 2013 inquiry.

Lessons for procurement change from the Common Agricultural Policy Delivery Programme

The Public Accounts Committee has just released its report on The Common Agriculture Policy Delivery Programme which could be the basis of an episode of 'The Thick of It' on change management. Indeed The Times uses the wonderful headline: "Civil servants' row with Mr Fancy Pants costs millions".

The report is short so you can quickly read it but some salient points are:

1. If you want a programme to be delivered successfully you need clarity, consistency and ownership of vision. Those supposedly driving this programme had competing objectives which hampered progress.
2. Make sure those bringing about the change and the leadership of the organisation to be changed can work together. 
3. Make sure the organisation is ready for the change. It appears the department concerned were neither ready nor adequately supported in the change.
4. Make sure the approach is pragmatic. A digital solution was being pursued even though the users lacked the skills and even the required broadband coverage.
5. Sometimes you need to go native. In this case the mistake was as basic as the change agent turning up in a very formalised setting dressed as if they could have been going to a beach party - the old saying 'clothes maketh the man' may sound trite but sometimes an unnecessary explicit culture clash can be perceived as arrogance and work against success.   

Let's remember that the failure in delivery cost money, £60m.

Are there any lessons for those seeking to bring about procurement change/improvement, yes, don't make the same mistakes!

Junior Doctors, the EU Referendum and procurement change management lessons

I honestly don't know who is right in the current NHS change management crisis with the Junior Doctors. Imposing the new contracts can only be viewed as a failure but it is also a symptom of the bigger failure of change management or mis-management. I suppose there are questions as to whether imposing contracts is even legal; like many of you, I have been the victim of having changed employment and pension contracts imposed on me - that did not make me feel good. There is of course no doubt that the NHS is in a crisis and the resolution of the Junior Doctors issue will set a precedent for future negotiations way beyond those with the Junior Doctors.

There is also a precedent for the current chaos - remember the communications debacle relating to care.data. The system was to improve service but the communications management was lousy.

The reason why I do not know whether Hunt or the Junior Doctors are right is very similar to the care.data debacle - the NHS communications setting out the current 'As-Is' and the future 'To-Be' has been abysmal. Those 'anti-change' have usefully played on emotion and fear. They have also managed to successfully infiltrate almost every one of the discussions on BBC Question Time for some weeks - the equivalent of the Greek Agora, the Roman Forum, and the works' canteen - the dessenters voice is very definitely the clearest and the loudest.  I ask myself why the NHS have not set out, in very simplistic terms, their case for change, perhaps on a webpage, a full page advertorial, or even a televised debate - that also needs to debunk the supposed myths of the BMA.  If that happened I could make an informed decision. If they really wanted to be aggressive they could also 'un-deify' the Junior Doctors - easy enough if you started to discuss the various NHS failures and how they could be linked to the problems the new contracts will overcome.

Of course the NHS' 'Junior Doctors' communications fiasco are only a warm-up for the EU debate - we can expect emotion and fear to dominate. We can expect communications to be poor - they already are.

So what about lessons for procurement? Well, if you want to bring about procurement change, the Junior Doctors crisis may serve as a useful warning:

1. Make clear, again, and again, and again, what the benefits of the 'To-Be' and how they address the problems of the 'As-Is';
2. Understand the negotiating power of those involved;
3. Understand the fears of those who will and could be impacted;
4. Address head-on the criticisms of the dessenters - some of their concerns will be justified, some will be nonsense, and some just scaremongering;
5. Remember that new systems and processes are not inanimate, they are concerned with people and it is people who will determine the effectiveness of the outcome;
6. Bring people with you, including those right on the periphery.

Marketing Procurement as a service - the issues

I hear and read a reasonable amount about the need to transfer Marketing principles over to Marketing the Procurement function as part of Procurement's transformation and repositioning.  Procurement Branding is all very well but a Brand is more than a streamline or logo, it's about the mental image conjured up in the potential customers head and that is often shaped by a perceived bad past experience.

It often strikes me that we tend to forget that Procurement is not a product but a service, and that brings with it unique problems. In Marketing the Procurement function needs to be aware of some of those problems if we are to effectively overcome them. Having said that, at some stage in the future I may discuss the Procurement Product Offerings, however, what are the problems:

1. The Procurement service is inseparable from the person receiving the service, viz, the internal customer of Procurement. You cannot separate the service user from its delivery/provision - their involvement is central. For example, let's say they can't help in shaping the specification or evaluation criteria, then how can you be sure it will fit there quality needs? Let's say they refuse to use you nicely negotiated framework arrangement, it really won't serve its purpose. Let's say they just don't want to take your advice, then regardless how good that advice is, it has little value in that particular procurement;
2. The Procurement service is heterogeneous, the person who delivers the Procurement 'Product' is a factor in the quality of the outcome. Let's say the Procurement Advisor gives poor quality advice, then the procurement is compromised - quality control is difficult because it depends on the quality of the procurement person and what's more it depends on how they are on the day. Let's say, the Procurement Advisor is caught up in dealing with a willingness to help an internal client, how can you be sure, in their enthusiasm to be helpful, they don't stray beyond their area of expertise and give an inappropriate answer? Let's say the person is just having an 'off day' then they may not give their best; 
3. The Procurement service is perishable - while the internal customer may be able to make use of FAQs on an intranet, they can't keep you in a drawer and only pull you out when required. Let's say you answer a query from an internal customer over the phone  - the minute the call is over you're vulnerable to whether the advice is misinterpreted or even forgotten. But let's say you were advising based on certain constraints unknown to the user, and the advise provided is wrongly applied by the user to a different environment. Really, once the service is consumed, it can't be reused as the same repeatedly. Equally, really good professional service could be quickly forgotten as a result of some minor bad experience or perceived bad experince;
4. The Procurement service is intangible - you can't place it on a shelf and say "look what I got from Procurement, would you like one for your Birthday?" . 

Of course we can devise strategies which might overcome these problems, for example, ensuring appropriately qualified staff, placing letters before and after our names, certificates on walls, etc. but if we want to really address Marketing Procurement a good place to start is understanding some of the issues.

Book review: 'Procurement Mojo'

This book has been around for over a year or so but I only got round to reading it after receiving it as a Christmas present from one of my daughters.  To be honest I think it was the title which put me off previously and, to be honest, try talking to a C-level stakeholder about the 'procurement mojo' and I suspect doors will close.

The book is well positioned in a niche which I'm unaware of others having addressed; setting aside procurement technicalities to focus on making the Procurement function more effective. You may well find some of the themes familiar as they are really transferred from the management literature you would expect to find in one of those airport shops - nothing wrong with that and Osagie makes an excellent transfer.  I really can't disagree with anything he says and can't think of any other book which addresses the themes in a Procurement context. Although I did  think the chapter on Branding was weak (I will return to this in a later Blog post). It would be particularly useful for those interested in Procurement Organisation & Management or even Procurement Change Management.

I did find some of the references to Osage's and others' research a bit aggravating since the detail was missing and it tends to be anecdotal - so it wouldn't work as an academic source. I also found the frequent cliches and case studies, which seemed to be more about demonstrating Osage's pedigree, annoying.

Set all those criticisms aside and you have a really good, easy to read book, relevant to all those who want to improve Procurement's strategic positioning as a function. Osage's five step approach  makes perfect sense and I suspect represents his own transformation approach:

1. Build an effective Procurement organisation;
2. Deploy robust fit-for-purpose enablers;
3. Adopt robust supply base management;
4. Apply appropriate performance management; and 
5. Build your Procurement brand.

I particularly liked the section on leadership but was surprised, when discussing processes, he didn't really explore the need to sort out processes only after you have define the new structure and roles. 

At only £14.99 Procurement Mojo is particularly good value (there has been a recent trend in over-pricing Procurement books lately) and an easy read. I think I will use aid memoire. 

Lessons on the cost of musical chairs at Westminster

Tucked away, understandably, in The Sunday Times was news that "MPs squander £140m on empty office" and typical finger-pointing that "a bunch of muppets" had been involved in this procurement decision!

The story in itself is easily summarised: a lease for 15 years (up until 2029 with no break clause), costing approximately £6m per year, has been taken out on a new office block on Victoria Street, less than half a mile from the Palace of Westminster, while renovations take place at the Palace of Westminster.  The plan had been that the new office would accommodate parliamentary staff currently housed in Millbank, and MPs would move to the former parliamentary staff offices at Millbank. Yet, a year later the offices remain empty and costs of £4m are being incurred for rates and services, allegedly because of fears MPs travelling from Millbank to vote in the House of Commons  could be vulnerable to attack.

(There is no mention of what the decanting costs associated with the musical chairs would have been or why the MPs couldn't move to the new Victoria Street office as opposed to Millbank!)

Now part of the solution appears to be that Department of Health staff move to the new offices, presumably so that the MPs can move to the DoH current HQ.  I assume there has been some risk assessment that suggests the journey up Whitehall is safer that the the journey along Victoria Street.

I certainly recognise, particularly in the light of the barbaric attacks last Friday in Paris, that there is a risk to MPs safety, but is it not true that MPs always have to travel to and from the Palace of Westminster, and also that they spend a lot of time in their constituencies 'out and about', so why is this particular journey so risky and ultimately costly?

There are some interesting questions which procurement could answer, for example:

1. Why was the contract signed and long before the MPs had agreed to move?
2. Why is there no 'break clause'?
3. What was the business justification for securing the new office accommodation so early?
4. Was there a risk assessment which recognised and mitigated against MPs reluctance to move to Millbank?
5. Is the contract for the Palace of Westminster renovations already signed and does that contract anticipate a completion date of 2029, allowing for the further decant of MPs back from their temporary locations? 
6. Is it reasonable to assume that a completion date of 2029 represents good practice - it seems a very long contract for renovations?
7. What contract management arrangements and contingencies will be put in place for the required complete date?
8. Prior to signing the lease, were all the relevant stakeholders consulted, including those responsible for MPs security? 
9. If effective stakeholder consultation took place, are "the muppets" not those who said the MPs journey from Millbank carried a manageable level of risk?
10. Had the Finance Committee, some of whom now find the contract "completely outrageous", had any scrutiny of the proposals before they were committed to?

The whole thing looks like a remarkable mess, yes, but perhaps it serves as a cautionary example of why procurement needs to be involved in this type of decision, and that a full options appraisal is required and risk assessment, prior to signing a contract.

Let Procurement's internal customers drive eProcurement Strategy

For a number of years I have seen P2P briefs which include reference to internal stakeholders desire for an 'Amazon like' user experience. Exposure in domestic life to how easy the 'electronic shopping experience' can be through the use of Amazon has raised individuals expectations of what the procurement process could be within the business environment. Having said that, even with that domestic experience, it still surprises me when Procurement staff tell me that the 'AsIs' process for Requisition to Purchase Order takes on average two weeks - my response is "Why aren't you aiming for two hours max?". What I see and feel on the ground is evidence that internal customers are pushing for change as opposed to Procurement staff shaping driving the change.

I have also met opposition from Procurement staff to the use of eAuctions. However, when you ask the individuals concerned if have they used eBay - the 'lights go on' and you can start to help them understand how eAuctions could deliver benefits in a business environment. In parallel, I've discovered that internal customers of Procurement have a greater appetite for the use of eAuctions than their Procurement Team.

Tonight I was delighted to see an advertisement on television for MyCarNeedsA. Perhaps some of you have been aware of this site for some time, regardless, it is a domestic electronic RFP solution. The domestic car owner specifies what work is required for their car and bids are then invited. I'm sure, given what I have outlined above, you will not be surprised that I have experienced opposition from Procurement Teams for the use of eSourcing tools. So I am delighted that internal customers of Procurement will now have an opportunity to experience eSourcing within a domestic environment and then hopefully push for their adoption within the business environment.

We have recognised for many years that individual's domestic experience influences their work expectations.  Of course there are many understandable reasons why Procurement staff may want to oppose the use of eProcurement tools but I find it disappointing that Procurement are not pushing harder for improvement and adoption of what are now basic tools.

Procurement should encourage internal customers to cry louder for the transfer of domestic eProcurement tools into the business environment. Procurement should see the domestic tools as part of a skills development plan. Yes, why not let Procurement's internal customers drive hard for an eProcurement Strategy. Would that not help Procurement?

Weathering the storm of justifying the need to buy at all

We are told the BBC are progressing through a tender process which means they will break their 93 year relationship with the Met Office since the Met Office haven't got through to the final stages. Already the advocates of a continuing BBC/Met relationship have started to cry this is bad value - the UK weather just can't be understood by 'foreign forecasters'!

It seems strange that critics of the likley procurement outcome refuse to recognise that if weather forecasting is a science, then suitably qualified forecasters, regardless of their origin, should be able to predict objectively.

I can only assume that the BBC have been following a robust, transparent and objective process. Have the Met Office been complacent in their bidding or are there genuinely better qualified competitors? If they want to throw stones at the BBC's procurement process would the critics not have been better to have criticised the selection process prior to its commencement. Perhaps the BBC should have carried out some stakeholder engagement in the process earlier and brought the advocates to the status quo with them.

Having said that, it seems logical that the Met Office would want the freedom to compete to deliver weather forecasts to other boardcasters too, without being subjected to nationalistic loyalty.  Why can't the defenders of the status quo recognise that for the Met Office to do that there has to be open competition.

However, my question is not about whether or not the weather forecast should be provided by the Met Office or not. Nor is my question about the selection and award criteria. or indeed its robustness.

To me there is a much more basic question, specifically the need for the BBC to spend money on providing a weather forecast at all. A lot has changed in 93 years. There are now so many sources of weather forecast open to the public, for example, apps on a smart phone tailored to specific locations. Just because there has been a 93 year history of the BBC providing weather forecasts doesn't justify a further 93 years of need to for the BBC to provide weather forecasts! But isn't that a common problem is procurement; a contract is due to expire so we need to relet. Wouldn't procurement improve its contribution and value by asking the much more relevant question: "Do we need to buy this at all?"

"Purchasing: Can we bridge the gap between strategy and daily reality?"

A new academic paper is in press at the moment for publication in Business Horizons: 'Purchasing: Can we bridge the gap between strategy and daily reality' by Knoppen and Saenz which I think is worth a read. The paper is based on the survey findings of the International Purchasing Survey - over 600 usable responses from North American and European purchasing professionals - and a few anonymised case studies.

At first I wondered why the paper wasn't published in one of the mainstream procurement journals, then I decided it may be the reported findings quite possibly jar against the message their editors generally want to accept.

Nevertheless the findings are important and certainly merit further debate and validation.

I am not going to steal the paper's thunder, but the key messages include that 47% of the respondents believe Purchasing (I take that also to cover the Procurement function) is not included in the strategic planning process, and 56% the purchasing are not focussed on long-term issues that involve risk and uncertainty. Furthermore that organisational structure tends to be either centralised or decentralised with little development of hybrid models.

Those findings certainly act as a reality check on the rhetoric but, I have to say find some resonance with what I have all too often seen in big household name companies. If the findings are reliable we need to stop the bluff and really get down to asking the serious question of why is Procurement still suffering from an identity crisis, despite almost 30 years of procurement's potential contribution having been identified, the financial crisis, and even the recent spate of procurement related supply chain risks manifesting themselves? Why are simplistic structural models still prevalent despite the benefits of hybrids? Is the problem that with the profession of those who look at the profession?

However, leaving solving the world's problems for another day, and getting back to the paper. In answering the core question the authors pose: Can we bridge the gap between strategy and daily reality? The authors use the case studies to demonstrate the answer is 'yes',  and identify key pitfalls in bridging the gap, namely:

1. No time for reflection;
2. Lack of scale;
3. Lack of scope;
4. Unaligned incentives. 

While I may question some of the content and approach, and feel there may be an over-simplification of the discussion and recommendations,  I encourage you to give some thought to the findings.

Marvel at the superheroes of central government procurement once again

Today's Business Section of the Sunday Times carried an interesting piece on the work of Bill Crother's in central government - he has clearly taken on the mantel of a superhero. What caught my eye was Crother's statement: “Where we have come from four years ago, we’ve made great strides, but there’s a long, long way to go.” 

I do not deny that significant progress may well have been made, but what I think we are all due is an explanation as to why the situation was, and continues to be so bad? When I reflect on the last 20 years we have had many in central government also implying they were procurement superheroes and often adopting quite an arrogant stance telling the NHS and local government 'how to do it'. Where are they now and what dod they actually leave behind - if Crother's is right, a mess. I will not start to name the names, but surely there is a need for some 'calling to account' as to what they actually achieved from their lofty positions - was it all rhetoric? It would be quite easy to do a trawl of Supply Management, for example, and read the how the superheroes of the past were going to sort out public procurement. They were held up as exemplars but never fell. They were never to blame, but sorting out a mess they had inherited! Sound familiar? 

As I see it we are likely to see this repeated over and over again because there does not appear to have been any meaningful performance management system which the incumbents answer to, nor any retrospective personal accountability. Call me a cynic, but before you do, tell what's actually changed over the last four years and how the latest superhero will be called to account?

For want of a compelling strategy

I must have read hundreds of Procurement Strategy documents, many of which were 'cut and paste' of another organisation's. The Strategy document sets out the directional plan for the coming period and signposts to the future desired state, it also provides the framework for making operational and tactical decisions. In getting ownership of the Strategy, the author, or their champion, needs to negotiate and 'sell' to key stakeholders. Of course we recognise that there is frequently a gap between the documented 'intended' strategy and what subsequently happens, the 'realised' strategy. The truth is that many of the documents I have read actually lack any To-Be, indeed many lack an ambition or need for change.

It is against that backdrop I read with interest that Dunelm have chased their chief executive, even with an increase in profit, over failure to reach agreement on strategy. The Directors wanted a more ambitious strategy and the CEO failed to set that out. It is also interesting that the Directors didn't like  the realised strategy which led to criticism that: "The stores look a bit more organised, a bit clearer, a bit easier to wheel a trolley around ...".  We do not know whether or not the Board had previously endorsed that strategy or whether the realised strategy differed from the agreed intended strategy.

Regardless, I wonder how many CPOs need to take heed of the example of the Dunelm example, ensure they have an ambitious strategy with the endorsed ownership of their Procurement Strategy and an implementation plan with appropriate KPIs to ensure implementation.  

'Cut the Cards: making SAP work' - Book review

At first glance you may wonder what relevance this book could have to you. Don't be put off by the title as it is not a book for SAP 'techies'; it is much more and I would view it as recommended reading for anyone on an MBA course or with an interest in PRINCE2. I suspect those who would benefit most though would be those designated as Sponsor of an ERP implementation and those charged with an oversight or scrutiny role.

Donnelly has produced an easily readable book on what could be a very dry subject and his black humor works very effectively. Having said that, assuming there is a second edition, I think the addition of section headings would be beneficial.

In a forensic analysis of public and private sector IT implementation disasters, Donnelly provides a diagnosis of what he believes really went wrong: cash-flow, poor leadership, self-serving partners, poor project management, poor risk management, and poor contract management are all there.  Key lessons for me are the need to modify SAPs standard processes as little as possible, so change management should be concerned with moving from the As-is to the correct SAP process, having the correct governance in place and use PRINCE2 methodology.

Also covered, although indirectly, is SAP's marketing strategy - a good case study in itself.

But what's there for a procurement practitioner? If there's an ERP project the CPO needs to have a seat at the table as part of the business case development, specifying, contract drafting, selection, risk management, change management and contract management. Then the CPO needs to be engaged with Blueprinting the To-Be - I have previously discussed how that should be an opportunity for procurement transformation, yet too often is missed through automating the existing, yes, that still happens!

CIPS Global Standard for Procurement & Supply gets the thumbs up.

CIPS have firmly positioned themselves in the world of 'Procurement' as opposed to 'Purchasing' with the release of the Global Standard for Procurement & Supply.

Some may argue that it is a bit revisionist to describe this as "the first of its kind" -  I could cite other antecedents, even endorsed by CIPS. Yet, setting that aside, this is a useful resource and credit is due to those who have created, what appears to be a very thorough piece of work.

Sadly though it does little to support the claim that commissioning is synonumous with procurement. Regular readers will know I disagree with that argument anyway. But how do public sector procurers, with social care being a critical spend item relate to the Standard?

I was also surprised, given the rise in Vendor Management Offices in the private sector, that the associated roles, and even the term Vendor Management, weren't included or specifically named within the framework - I think CIPS missed an opportunity there. Yes, I recognise the similarities with Contract Managers but aren't Vendor Relationship Managers slightly different?

Setting those issues aside, one of the great virtues of the Standard is that it can be viewed as objective. So if you first gain acceptance of the Standard, then you can have a more reasoned depersonalised discussion on matching the standards.

I recently had to complete an evaluation of some staff and their competencies, and then develop role descriptions for new posts - the Standard would have helped a lot and I recognise that I will draw on this in the future.  I can also see its role in completion of Training Needs Analysis.

On balance, the Standard gets a 'thumbs up' from me and a thanks to all those involved in its development.

Can the Major Projects Authority deliver?

The Financial Times reported this week that John Manzoni, head of the UK Major Projects Authority,  has now lost critical expertise due to outsourcing and now lags "five to eight years behind business". He also implies an absence of execution and delivery skills - that's not a big surprise as I have frequently discussed the gap between policy and implementation. A related article then talks about the scarcity of skills in Whitehall to deliver big programmes.

Let's be honest, the average man or woman in the street could have said that.

But the average man and woman in the street wouldn't be in a position to understand that there have already been many, many, many years investment in MSP and PRINCE2 training over the years. There have been no shortage of methodologies and training opportunities, either - reflect on the former Civil Service College prospectus.

While I support the notion of the Major Projects Authority, my prediction is that it will just join the plethora of other good but failed ideas.  Sadly, it too, will in all probability, fail in delivering the desired outcome. Why? Well quite simply, we don't need school lessons on why projects fail. We need  a breed of managers who are brave enough to say to politicians: "No - this isn't the best approach", "We're not ready yet",  "We haven't sufficient resources", etc..

The problem is that those good writing and negotiating policy are politicans echoing what Politicians want to hear - they are diplomats as opposed to change managers. Perhaps they see implementation as 'lower down the food chain". Rewards, in the form of promotions aren't for delivery, they are for political nous not the bravery to speak truth.

Can the Major Projects Authority itself deliver? I don't think you can change the DNA of those who have been groomed in risk aversion. Nevertheless, let's revisit this blog in five years time and see if I am wrong.

Public sector food procurement target - smoke and mirrors or easy win?

David Cameron must be quite excited announcing tha public sector canteens will now be ordered to buy British. And I'm sure the author of The Plan for Public Procurement, Peter Bonfield, is also quite excited. After all the public sector is a major buyer of food and, as we know from the horse meat scandal, wasn't that diligent about ensuring sources.

But hold on a second, we've been here before - wasn't there the Public Sector Food Procurement Initiative launched in 2003 which set out in a report some great achievements? Was that evaluation telling fibs?

So, is the Plan for Public Procurement just recycling policy? Is it a challenge to the public sector that the previous Initiative wasn't embedded? Was the previous Initiative sacrificed during the spending cuts? Have the targets already been achieved? What will be different?

As Cameron and Bonfield annouce the 'new' perhaps they should shed some light on the 'old'.

Not a good day for IT procurement strategy news

Not a good day for public procurement IT stories: two embarassing stories.  One looks like a procurement risk management and strategy issue linked with implementing a policy, regardless of understanding the risks; the second, concerns procurement project leadership credibility.


The Financial Times suggests the the Cabinet Office strategy of moving from big IT companies may have compromised effective delivery, in that the consortium of SMEs used as a preferred strategy may have stretched capability and led to service failures. 'Shambolic' is the term used!  While there are calls for delaying further rollout until lessons are learnt, is it not obvious that a phased rollout should have started with small departments should have been managed by the client with a watchful eye. Equally, while I can understand the sentiment of the policy, why on earth were ministers not aware of the risks, or were they?

The second story, this time in The Times, concerns the allocation of responsoibility for the Met's 'Total Technology' modernisation programme. It appears that one of those responsible for managing the programme brings with him unfortunate baggage of a past IT failure which cost £15m. While Grant Thornton found the oversight of the failed project in Surrey was 'not fit for purpose' it seems Rowley, who is now leading 'Total Technology', doesn't recognise that as relating to his leadership. Failure to recognise the need to learn lessons isn't a good place to be in - Mr Rowley and the Met need to understand what went wrong at Surrey and how those lessons will be applied in the future. As it is, Rowley's ability to gain the confidence of the programme team may already have compromised success. It is not a good omen.

So some key messages:

1. A policy needs to be risk assessed and then implementation managed;
2. If the decision is made to pursue a policy and strategy which is high risk it is best have a phased implementation starting with lower risk areas;
3. Where a project has failed due to leadership which is 'not fit for purpose' understand the reasons behind that statement, acknowledge the failure if necessary, and be clear how the lessons learnt with be applied;
4. Do expect a failed leader to deliver better leadership on a bigger programme without ensuring a strong governance structure is in place.