The risk of unshared service at Whitehall

Few will be surprised at the failure of the Whitehall Shared Service, set up in 2013, to deliver its anticipated savings.  I remember when first being asked to give a view on the tender document saying the major risk would be getting sufficient buy-in from the departments to deliver the benefits.  Sure enough, only two departments have now adopted the 'shared service', four others having dropped out along the way.  You can read the NAO report but, to me, for the initiative to be a success there needed to be leadership, risk management, change management, technical capability of the provider and programme management.  I'm sure the Major Projects regime will have its own view - let's face it the MPA must have to provide some accountability for delivery.

1. Leadership: who was/is leading this initiative providing a compelling agrument to ensure and the potential user departments stay the journey?
2. Risk management: How were the risks accessed and managed, particuluarly the risk of failing to deliver the business case, failure to have sufficient confidence in the new solution to shift from the old systems, failure to gain ownership of the departments, and more, to grow the number of users, failure to ensure the provider will sufficient income to 'stay the distance'?
3. Change management: I fear that like so many of these projects the emphasis will have been on the technical solution and as a result the 'people aspects' will have been sidelined - these initiatives are never just a technical solution, there will be people who need to want to shift to the new ways of working.
4. Does it work: Of course the technology has to do  what it is supposed to better than the 'old ways' but it also has to remain current and reflect the speed to innovation in technology.

Now those politically and managerially responsible need to have a response plan. Can they learn the lessons, salvage the relationships with those who have 'dropped out' and still make the investment deliver its projected benefits?  For the rest of us we can only learn.

Can the Major Projects Authority deliver?

The Financial Times reported this week that John Manzoni, head of the UK Major Projects Authority,  has now lost critical expertise due to outsourcing and now lags "five to eight years behind business". He also implies an absence of execution and delivery skills - that's not a big surprise as I have frequently discussed the gap between policy and implementation. A related article then talks about the scarcity of skills in Whitehall to deliver big programmes.

Let's be honest, the average man or woman in the street could have said that.

But the average man and woman in the street wouldn't be in a position to understand that there have already been many, many, many years investment in MSP and PRINCE2 training over the years. There have been no shortage of methodologies and training opportunities, either - reflect on the former Civil Service College prospectus.

While I support the notion of the Major Projects Authority, my prediction is that it will just join the plethora of other good but failed ideas.  Sadly, it too, will in all probability, fail in delivering the desired outcome. Why? Well quite simply, we don't need school lessons on why projects fail. We need  a breed of managers who are brave enough to say to politicians: "No - this isn't the best approach", "We're not ready yet",  "We haven't sufficient resources", etc..

The problem is that those good writing and negotiating policy are politicans echoing what Politicians want to hear - they are diplomats as opposed to change managers. Perhaps they see implementation as 'lower down the food chain". Rewards, in the form of promotions aren't for delivery, they are for political nous not the bravery to speak truth.

Can the Major Projects Authority itself deliver? I don't think you can change the DNA of those who have been groomed in risk aversion. Nevertheless, let's revisit this blog in five years time and see if I am wrong.

Invisible ink used on the script of HS2 justification

It's very strange that a Government which advocates transparency wants to be very, very opaque. Wasn't the argument for transparency that the army of armchair auditors would be able to call their political masters to account and only those who had something to hide should fear transparency? I suppose you can understand the desire for opaqueness when it comes to the Department of Transport who suffered badly when the figures behind the West Coast rail franchise were exposed to scrutiny and unravelled? Understanding isn't the same as justification though.

Transparency delivers other benefits. The armchair auditors can be part of the risk management process providing constructive critique and highlighting risks which might otherwise have been overlooked.  Transparency also wins stakeholder confidence and helps with change management. Those benefits can't be realised if you opt for secrecy. Yet, in an age of Wikileaks and Edward Snowden does anyone seriously believe the Report will remain concealed?

However, the latest act in the HS2 farce is the decision yesterday, not to publish a report of the Major Projects Authority by invoking a bizarre workaround of the Freedom of Information Act. Withholding the report only feeds the beast of cynicism and further undermines confidence in the project. Not only that but it forgoes the benefits of transparency and makes it more difficult to argue that others should provide visibility of their decisions.

Thus spake PAC on Universal chaos and waste

"...the Department lacked an overarching business transformation strategy, and focused its effort on the programme's IT aspects. The failure to develop a comprehensive plan which will deliver these important changes has led to substantial nugatory expenditure which has yet to be finally determined and extensive delays in the implementation of the programme. 

 The Department accepts that timescales have slipped and that value has not been secured from the X million[s] invested so far. There has been a shocking absence of financial and other internal controls and we are not yet convinced that the Department has robust plans to overcome the problems that have impeded progress. Our recommendations are designed to help get the programme back on track. In particular the Department needs a robust plan on how to transform its business and what is required from the new IT systems it intends to use to support the transformation. If the Department is to secure the benefits it seeks, the new IT capabilities must enable more online operations, must address fraud risks, and result in a system capable of handling the real-world complexities of [key users] circumstances. The Department must be realistic and transparent about its expected costs and timescales, and the milestones against which we can hold it to account. We believe strongly that meeting any specific timetable from now on is less important than delivering the programme successfully."

It's highly likely that a high proportion of the millions invested will have to be written off. Without even getting beyond the summary, it isn't hard to ask "aren't these the basics of PRINCE2 and MSP?"  However, how many other projects could the same narrative apply to with a little 'cut and paste'?

But just in case you thought this was all the fault of IT strategists and policy wonks;  procurement were also named and shamed:

You've got to accentuate the positive,

Eliminate the negative,

Latch on to the affirmative,

Don't mess with Mr In-Between. 

I tweeted recently to that effect: 'Student loans misunderstood, Health reforms misunderstood, DWP reforms misundertood: Dave and the Commotions, 'Please don't let me be misunderstood''.

Communication misunderstandings aren't unique to public policy reform, they are also a frequent procurement weakness; the procurement 'end' appears to be misunderstood.  An example was provided as recently as 2 March with the furore over the supposed 'police privatisation'. The only message which appeared to have been communicated was the 'negative'.  Why was there such a complete lack of confidence in the affirmative that the procurement could deliver a better outcome for citizens even though so much appears to have been contracted in the past? Highly respected procurement commentator, Peter Smith, even went so far as to refer to it as an example of 'stupid sourcing'  While I largely agree with Peter, in terms of a questionable sourcing strategy but the stupidest aspect is the associated communications strategy.

A lot of my blogs ask the simple question, 'Did the procurement deliver the anticipated results?'  I have argued that effective political leadership, scrutiny and use of 'fearless' gateway reviews all have a contribution to effective procurement outcomes - they certainly would have helped with the police procurement debacle.  But these are concerned with the procurement 'means' as opposed to the procurement 'end'.  The achievement of the outcome sometimes gets lost in the bureaucratic process or indeed in debating the process.

Yet I have also argued that suggesting some ends can be met when the process constrains that is also political folly.

Nevertheless, too many times investment just hasn't delivered what it was supposed to - that epitomises ineffective procurement;