Is there a lesson for procurement in Tory's forgotten manifesto?

The suggestion that the Chancellor's advisors simply "forgot the manifesto"  may well be a symptom of incompetence or just contempt for previous commitments but it does have lessons for procurement leaders.  First let's think about the purpose of a manifesto - it sets out the basis on which the political party seeks election and says "if you elect us, we'll do this".  It is a bit like a contract commitment with the electorate. It is a commitment, through choice, to pursue a particular strategy. Simply 'forgetting' that policy commitment and strategy is a serious breach of trust.

So what's the 'forgetting the manifesto' lesson for procurement? Well, I have long since stopped being surprised when I find out that procurement staff are oblivious to the higher-level policies, and even their own prior commitments, which are supposed to shape their decisions.  For example, a commitment that all staff complete anti-bribery training - when you ask the staff when they last completed it they were unaware of such a commitment.  Then there's the Fairtrade commitments, the sustainable procurement commitments, prompt payment commitments, .... need I go on? Breach of all these 'policy' commitments represents a reputational risk at the very least.  Let's face it the commitments are rarely made without a lot of deliberation and business case justification.

Many of those commitments are voluntary but there are also statutory commitments - surprisingly there appears to be little external policing of those, for example, the Equality Act, Modern Slavery Act and Bribery Act.

Strange thing is when you interview staff for a position, quite frequently they can trot out all the relevant commitments!

Is this a case of selective memory or perhaps just ignorance? Both could be factors but they are unlikely to be the only causes.

My suggestion to ensure there is no 'forgetting' is that:

1. Complete an audit to identify and catalogue external and internal commitments;
2. Embed within risk management, yes, even at the top table;
3. Raise awareness; 
4. Ensure no commitments are overlooked through the use of checklists for both strategy and tactical decisions. 

The UK Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer now appear to have to backtrack due to 'forgetting the manifesto' - surely there's a lesson for procurement risk management to make sure there isn't a similar carryover in your organisation.

Barcodes in the NHS - I'm mystified, tell me I'm wrong.

"Barcodes are going to be used in the NHS" has been a headline story on the TV today and in the press.  Now I've had more than my fair share of NHS treatment over the years and I completely support harnessing the potential of barcode use.

I'd also like a barcode to be issued to me the moment I enter the A&E carpark, yes the carpark, and that then tracks how long it takes until I leave with a hopefully a smiley face - shouldn't waiting time be reported from the time I arrive on site, shouldn't there be something which sets aside hospital carparking fees when the cause has been NHS queuing inefficiency?

However, back to the real world, what struck me with the TV coverage of the story was that the practitioners were not emphasising patient tracking, risk management and accountability, but stock control! Stock control?

I am absolutely mystified, that after so many 'cost down' initiatives in the NHS, we are being led to believe that it is only now barcodes are being piloted in stock control. Let's remember barcodes were introduced in the 1970s. The news coverage suggests a pilot NOT a rollout, mind you.

I would really like to be reassured that basic good practice stock control and purchasing, including the use of barcodes, has been practiced for years and that the news coverage is misleading?  I'd like to understand, and have a darn good explanation why barcodes haven't been used and I'd like someone to explain why the potential cost benefits have been missed?  If the news coverage is correct, and barcodes are not widely used, I would like to understand the NHS strategy for Innovation transfer? In fact, could someone explain to me who will give an explantation why the Government's 2008 white paper on innovation doesn't seem to have been performance managed?

It's time for a review of the impact of procurement legislation

Today The Times reported that the Ministry of Defence takes bribery and corruption very seriously and has made dozens of allegations about bribery and corruption in supply chains.   Now, I ask you, which organisation is going to admit it doesn't take bribery and corruption seriously?

However, often when I meet with 'procurement leaders' and make reference to the Modern Slavery Act, and/or the Bribery Act, I don't get the impression either of those pieces of legislation are taken that seriously at all. Indeed, I am often left with feeling nothing is really happening there.

Perhaps, as a profession, it is time to take stock and ask what difference these types of legislation actually have on the procurement community.  Are we fooling ourselves?

Surely if the profession is committed to the spirit of the legislation it would make sense to lead an impact assessment to establish 'so what?'.  Commitment to the spirit of the legislation isn't enough.  I suggest we need performance management, and yes, sanctions on those within the profession - I have to think long and hard to recall any 'naming, shaming and being struck off' - are we fooling ourselves that all is rosy.

Gove turns his guns on procurement and programme management

One time thought to be a contender to become PM, former Secretary of State for Education, and Secretary of State for Justice has set his sights on public sector procurement and programme management professionals today, in a Comment piece in the Times. I will watch with interest the Letters section to see if CIPS reply.

Gove does a fine job of cataloguing procurement and programme management disasters. Indeed, many of the cases he cites are those I have blogged about in the past and/or used as case studies when training.  I will spare you an echoing of the cases; the average man or women on the street is familiar with many of them anyway.

While it is interesting that Gove has put pen to paper on a subject dear to many of us, what is particularly interesting is who he considers to blame - the 'Sir Humphrey's but not the Ministers.

Gove calls for a shift to weekly reporting on progress to Parliament of procurements and programmes. Would there be enough Parliamentary time and, if there was the time, would we see any interest from MPs?

Controversially he also wants to

see the names of civil servants responsible for these programmes to be published, their explanations for failure (or success) recorded and those who've failed be removed while those who can demonstrate clear, measurable, success get promoted. I know this concept- let's call it accountability - may be somewhat revolutionary for our civil service.

This is an interesting notion but isn't Gove missing the point about why we have Ministers in charge of government departments?  It is the democratically elected politicians who have to call those in their own departments to account.  It is the democratically elected politicians who have to rein in the pursuit of unrealistic political timescales.  It is the democratically elected politicians who have to develop the skills to scrutinise and manage professionals to ensure that they deliver on their objectives. Yes, perhaps civil servants need to use a louder voice in explaining to politicians the risks of pursuing some projects. But you can't just point the finger at the civil servants without recognising a failure of political performance management.

Also worrying is the implication that civil servants are being influenced by lobby groups. Can he really believe that, and if he does, why doesn't he blow the whistle on what really amounts to corruption.

This, one time, very influential political may well have lost a lot of his power, but should he ever regain it, CIPS will have a major problem if they don't educate the former Secretary of Education now.

  

Approval processes, the Queen and Parliament

I've been giving a lot of thought lately to approval processes for big investments, not just procurement. Part of my thinking has been concerned with how you would define a good approval process and evaluate the 'As-Is' - my early thinking is that it would exhibit the following:

• Robust governance at the appropriate level;
• Clarity of who owns and is accountable for the business case;
• Consistency in application;
• Visibility and transparency - knowing when a given need is in the process and what's happening;
• Understood by users;
• Pragmatism;
• Integration with the wider eco-system.

How do those attributes sound to you?  What else would you include?

Anyway, news that the The Queen is now seeking approval from parliament for £369m of repairs to one of her homes was timely.  Basically Parliament hold the purse strings and need to approve the cost of the repairs at Buckingham Palace, but the current issue is why, within 12 months, has the estimated cost rose from £150m to £369m for the ten-year refit?  

We are told that last year's estimate "was one of several estimates" and didn't include inflation!  Hold on, what is the current rate of inflation, isn't it just under 1%, over the next ten years will that be radically different?  Of the 'several estimates' received last year, what was the range, and was there some selective presentation of the figures to secure last years approval in principle? It's surprising they didn't blame it on Brexit too.

I think it may be interesting to understand why such an investment is now needed - was there no investment in recent years in preventative maintenance? Is this all reactive?  Surely those managing the Royal Estate should be concerned with preventative maintenance and there shouldn't be a need for such a massive investment?

But let's also remember that this latest discussion is about approval to invest the now £369m. When I discuss an integrated approach in my list of attributes of an approval process, I'm referring to integration with what happens after approval has been granted.  I want to see approvals within stated tolerances and subsequent governance and scrutiny in the contract award and implementation, including project management. Without that Parliament would be buying a promise and abdicating responsibility for ensuing actual value for money is achieved, not just the aspiration.  There's another interesting question here, if you recall Westminster Palace is also in need of a massive refurbishment - is there no strategy for looking across the portfolio and planning accordingly?

Were procurement voices heard at Bristol's European Green Capital?

I'm sure it will have escaped many of you that Bristol was the European Green Capital in 2015. The Times have just revelled some of the £12m of procurement's involved:

• £37,000 wiring a tree with a sound and light system activated by falling beechnuts, only to discover that it was predictably going to be a lean year for beechnuts; 
• £49,200 creating an artificial fog over footbridge;
• £84,000 for life size wicker sculpture of whales;
• £5,000 for a guest speaker;
• £3,800 for pies provided to guests at a launch party;
• £25,00 for a 'happy cities' survey;
• £6,000 for a circus group;
• £18,000 for use of 'Shaun the sheep' image on promotional materials;
• £1,000 a month for a press-cuttings service.

Now let's assume that proper procurement policies were in place and processes complied with - although we know that often 'arms length' bodies feel they are beyond that.  Let's also assume that there was some benchmarking to ensure that the various deals represented good value for money.

The previous Mayor of Bristol claims the year was a "massive success". Unsurprisingly, others don't agree but is that criticism justified? There must have been a strategy for the year and that should have drilled down to the various event components - those responsible for governance had a responsibility to ensure that was scrutinised and justified and not just 'rubber stamped'. It would have been good if that plan had been published and consulted upon as that would have deflected some of the later criticisms.

It would also have been good if the initiative were subjected to an independent outcome assessment - that would have demonstrated the economic and environmental benefits gained - the ratio of cost to benefits.

As with so many of these types of initiatives money was pooled from various big funders: £1m from the City Council to pump-prime, and that brought a further £7m from the government £3m-£4m from the private sector.  I actually know nothing about the governance structure which was put in place, but to me, Bristol City Council probably came out on top. However, I would like to have seen a pro-rata allocation of influence at the governance table based on the funding provided - those funders had real 'skin in the game' and needed to be clear these were procurements they had confidence in as opposed to rubber stamping, of worse, giving without control. I wonder how many procurement voices were heard at that table?

The mystery of CIPS Life Honorary Membership

We have previously discussed CIPS' License, and even Chartered Status, but I only recently became aware of CIPS Life Honorary Membership. 

My awareness started when one of you shared with me their intention to leave CIPS but only decided to remain when they were offered free lifetime membership - I don't want to share the details of those particular circumstances, but my friend's understanding was that the offer was made due to the number of years they'd been a CIPS member. 

Now I've been a member since the 80s so I decided to enquire about eligibility.  

As many of you will know I have been a great supporter of transparency of the procurement process and have advocated stating award criteria beyond the requirements of the EU Regulations. It strikes me as just good practice. I would have thought CIPS would have advocated a similar approach to transparency. However, when I wrote to CIPS I received this reply:

Thank you for your email. I must advise that you are not eligible for life honorary membership. I cannot advise the criteria for this membership but I recommend you email again with your query in a few years.

Of course, that was like waving the proverbial 'red rag to a bull', so I challenged the 'secrecy' and it was reiterated: "As advised I am not able to discuss the criteria", and subsequently:

Life honorary membership is rewarded on a discretionary basis and is not automatically awarded. There is no fixed criteria and each case is reviewed individually.

I'm not sure if CIPS meant to say 'rewarded' but exasperated by CIPS lack of transparency I said I would use my blog and try to establish others awareness of the process. Here's what they said:

I am sorry that you feel disappointed with the information that you have been provided.  Reading through the previous emails it appears that you have been led to believe that Life Honorary Membership is something that our members are entitled to after a certain period of time.  All I can do is reiterate what my colleague has told you that this is not correct and that this is a discretionary award on a case by case basis. I appreciate that you wish to blog about this, however I must stress that we are the team who handle these enquiries and as such are the experts in this area, any information gathered from other sources cannot be treated as reliable.

Using the shield of "we are ...  the experts in this area" echoes the criticism levelled at the profession many years ago when buyers refused to demonstrate professionalism in contract awards which only led to cynicism and suspicion.  

Equally, while information gained from a blog may not be reliable, CIPS isn't prepared to provide any clarity at all.  Let's remember that CIPS membership fees must subsidise this cabal and its beneficiaries.

I don't know about you but that leads me to ask: who decides there is a case for Life Honorary Membership, who are the Life Honorary Members, and, given the lack of any fixed criteria, how can we have confidence in the process? A straw poll of members with over 25 years MCIPS/FCIPS membership indicates few are even aware of the category of membership!

So, if any of you can provide the clarity which CIPS can't/won't provide on the dark secrets of CIPS Life Honorary Membership, I'd love to hear? It would be better that we had the transparency of a professional organisation than the perception of application of the black arts. 

Fifa's "Unfavourable" contract should be a warning for all Board members

I'm sure many of you heard the news this morning of the latest PR disaster to befall FIFA, namely, that its President signed a contract "unfavourable to Fifa" and in doing so "violated his fiduciary duties and acted against the interest of Fifa...".

I have to admit this is the first time I have heard such a phrase used so I'l have to watch as the story unfolds to learn more.

I assume a contract can be unfavourable to an organisation under the following circumstances:

• Contracting for something which is not required;
• Contracting on contractual terms which place more power than is necessary with the supplier;
• Contracting on commercial terms which do not represent value for money;
• Contracting for a longer term than makes commercial sense.

However, the news reminded me of one of my early jobs which included the signing and sealing of contracts - way back in 1974 when I was a mere 17 year old.

Let me first tell you about 'the Seal'. The was stored in a strongroom. The key for the strongroom was kept in a safe. That key was used to open the main strongroom door - which was really heavy to move. Then a separate key was used to get through the next door which looked like prison bars. Then  a further two keys were used to unlock what looked like an enormous vice. Only then could you seal the contracts by placing each of the signed contracts in the gap between the vice and closing the vice - the contract then had the imprint of the seal embedded on it.

However, prior to sealing the contract, I first had to get the contract signed by the Town Clerk. I'd make an appointment, fold and mark each of the contracts so that the place for signature was clear and then place each of the contracts before the Town Clerk while he signed, in all probability multi-tasking by drinking a cup of coffee or reading other papers. Success, for me, was minimising the amount of time spent by the Town Clerk signing the contracts.

The contract signed by the Town Clerk then had to have the Lord Mayor's signature too.  Once again an appointment was made, I sat with the Lord Mayor and we made small talk as I placed each contract before him for signature. The objective: get in, get the contracts signed, and out as quickly as possible!

That's a lot of formality for a reason (and from memory the threshold at which contracts had to be sealed was as low as £15,000) but yet there was virtually no scrutiny. The contracts were signed by both the Town Clerk and Lord Mayor without their reading on the assumption that those in the Town Solicitor's Office and Purchasing had spent time making sure everything was in order prior to signature.

I wonder will Sepp Blatter use a similar argument as his defence, that he was merely completing a formality on the assumption that the due diligence was completed by others as part of their 'day job'?

But let's remember that those who 'sign on the line' do so for a reason, only they have the authority to commit the organisation to contracts. They are representing those who placed them in power and gave them the authority to commit on their behalf. Whether or not Sepp Blatter manages to exhibit the skills of Houdini is secondary, the allegation that he signed an unfavourable contract should serve as a reminder to all those Board Members who sign contracts of the need to protect themselves, if not their organisations.

Child labour and talk are too cheap - meaningful action is what counts.

David Cameron is using a platform in Vietnam today to announce the UK's initiative to stamp out child labour in supply chains. Don't get me wrong, I find child labour absolutely abhorrent and really do believe in the power of responsible procurement. However, I doubt Cameron's initiative to stamp out child labour, based on all companies with a turnover of over £36m publishing an annual slavery and human trafficking statement, will have any significant impact.

Does David Cameron actually believe that companies have that sort of supply chain visibility or even the skills? Does the public sector have that sort of visibility and skills?

The initiative will require companies to declare what checks they have in place. What would be considered acceptable robust checks? Will Cameron's minister who leads on public procurement be in a position to be accountable to parliament and the electorate for the steps public procurement have taken - if not it is a bit hypocritical to not to lead by example. Perhaps Cameron should add this to his wish-list of EU reforms - that will be popular but then isn't cutting red tape a big issue too!

How is the initiative going to be communicated to UK companies? August is unlikely to be the best time to raise awareness.

In companies which do become aware of the initiative who will have ownership and be accountable? Will it be allocated to the Health & Safety Officer like so much of environmental purchasing, the CFO as part of their accounting statements, the CPO who control so little of the budget decisions, marketing who will want to put a good gloss on whatever the reality is, or the risk manager who is often a voice crying in the wilderness? Whoever holds responsibility will be a good indicator of how seriously the initiative is taken - why doesn't Cameron insist there's a named responsible owner?

I assume the statement will need to be audited in some form, who will do that?

What if the companies don't comply? It appears the sanction is criticism! Is that supposed to be a serious sanction? I have previously discussed reputational risk linked with supply chain abuses and how it really doesn't seem to manifest itself  in the market. I have also questioned the conviction of politicians to see some of these great ideas through to the end rather than just looking for something to say in a speech.

So, do I expect to see some discernible change in five years against today's benchmark? Actually is there a benchmark against which progress will be measured?

PS 31 July 2015 - here's a link to the relevant section of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 

Tesco, the Groceries Code Adjudicator and CIPS

You are probably already aware that the Groceries Code Adjudicator has announced that her first inquiry will be into Tesco's 'supply chain bullying'. Of course this is not the first inquiry to touch Tesco's fallen angel procurement, it joins those of the Serious Fraud Office and the Financial Reporting Council.

You may have thought this was an appropriate time for the newly badged Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply to show its teeth too, but I was amazed to learn that David Noble, CIPS CX response to the news of the Groceries Code Adjudicator's inquiry was:

"This remedial action is tantamount to closing the stable door once the horse has bolted"

What on earth is the business world to understand from such a platitude? Surely, CIPS are not advocating the potential breach of the Code should not be investigated? What action are CIPS proposing to take in demonstrating its own Ethical Code has teeth? Would this not have been the right time for CIPS to have championed the Inquiry and champion good supply chain management practice?

Strategic procurement programmes: Before and after

We're all familiar with the 'before and after' images which so often paint a picture that suggests 'after' is more attractive than 'before'. If only that were the case with strategic procurements.

After years of 'before' trumpeting the anticiapted aspirational success of the NHS National Programme for IT, a programme which appeared to be the offspring of political egotism, the first signs of faltering, and the cosmetics of a name change, now politicians want answers:

"There has to be a reckoning. We have to know how much money has been squandered and what could have been done instead."

"If the people letting the contract have made a catastrophic, gargantuan mistake then there is an opportunity cost. It is the taxpayer who has to fork out money for what should have been spent n services they need."

To me the NPfIT was clear who was leading and the governance structure to be used. But back in 2011 I asked what happened to the application of Gateway Reviews on the Programme. Of course MPs received NAO reports on the Programme's progress too - they were not ignorant of the risks.

So when the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Administration Select Committee sit down looking for answers, I hope they start by considering their own role in oversight - didn't they have a responsibility to the electorate? They could ask about political pressure that that was exerted and if civil servants 'pushed back'? They could then ask about who was getting paid for Programme leadership, where, when and why it went wrong? Then they could get the detailed findings of the Gateway Reviews? Then look at the risk register, how it was reviewed and when and what actions were taken? Then they could look at similar debacles, of which there are many, forget the political rhetoric and posturing? Finally they must ensure an environment exists which ensures there are very real penalties in place for those who should have blown the whistle on this and similar programmes yet didn't - did they lack the knowledge or the spine?

Unfortunately the 'after' looks fairly ugly for this Programme but perhaps the Beast could spawn some Beauty's for the future.

Not a good day for IT procurement strategy news

Not a good day for public procurement IT stories: two embarassing stories.  One looks like a procurement risk management and strategy issue linked with implementing a policy, regardless of understanding the risks; the second, concerns procurement project leadership credibility.


The Financial Times suggests the the Cabinet Office strategy of moving from big IT companies may have compromised effective delivery, in that the consortium of SMEs used as a preferred strategy may have stretched capability and led to service failures. 'Shambolic' is the term used!  While there are calls for delaying further rollout until lessons are learnt, is it not obvious that a phased rollout should have started with small departments should have been managed by the client with a watchful eye. Equally, while I can understand the sentiment of the policy, why on earth were ministers not aware of the risks, or were they?

The second story, this time in The Times, concerns the allocation of responsoibility for the Met's 'Total Technology' modernisation programme. It appears that one of those responsible for managing the programme brings with him unfortunate baggage of a past IT failure which cost £15m. While Grant Thornton found the oversight of the failed project in Surrey was 'not fit for purpose' it seems Rowley, who is now leading 'Total Technology', doesn't recognise that as relating to his leadership. Failure to recognise the need to learn lessons isn't a good place to be in - Mr Rowley and the Met need to understand what went wrong at Surrey and how those lessons will be applied in the future. As it is, Rowley's ability to gain the confidence of the programme team may already have compromised success. It is not a good omen.

So some key messages:

1. A policy needs to be risk assessed and then implementation managed;
2. If the decision is made to pursue a policy and strategy which is high risk it is best have a phased implementation starting with lower risk areas;
3. Where a project has failed due to leadership which is 'not fit for purpose' understand the reasons behind that statement, acknowledge the failure if necessary, and be clear how the lessons learnt with be applied;
4. Do expect a failed leader to deliver better leadership on a bigger programme without ensuring a strong governance structure is in place.

A very political procurement

In 2012 I published a paper on International Lessons on Austerity Strategy - one of the key lessons being the  advantages of having projects 'shovel ready' so that you could deploy procurement to stimulate the economy and accelerate the recovery. That meant planning approvals gained and availability of construction resources 'ready to go'.

If you did that you could reduce unemployment and the human trauma which accompany it, you could also shift from paying benefits to receiving tax and national insurance income.

Today we learn that more than 200 projects are being announced to rebuild Britain - all to start during 2014/15. Some would scream "why weren't these measures taken much earlier to prevent the flooding and now dangerous condition of our roads?".

Of course the cynic could also say this investment is political - designed to create jobs and have a visible impact of 'something happening' in the run up to the election.

The spotlight now moves to the procurement, project management and risk management of over 200 major projects. If the procurement is successful the next election will see a celebration of successful delivery of improvement public services, local economic development and jobs. If the procurement is unsuccessful the spotlight can be expected to be on procurement blame.

Perhaps it is timely that Locke has just been released!

I have absolutely no understanding of the preparations prior to this announcement but it will be a significant test for the Major Projects Authority too. I assume that someone has checked the capacity to deliver on what could become a very political procurement.

One more time: get the procurement processes right and stick to them.

You may well be familiar with the old hymn 'Tell me the old, old story' - it strikes me there is a procurement version: 'Get the procurement processes right and then stick to them'. Time and again we find those basics just aren't adhered to, yet we hear grandiose ideas of procurement being really strategic - are there parallel universes?

Perhaps operational procurement is forgotten and the cry is that the processes must be wrong - if the processes are wrong, fix them, don't avoid them. Broken processes and worse, unadhered to processes have no place in either efficiency, value for money or competitiveness. They also create the environment for procurement fraud, bribery and corruption.

So let's think about some of the basics which Larne Borough Council, like some many, have got wrong and no doubt will be echoed elsewhere shortly:

1. If you enter into an agreement - get it signed asap;
2. If you have awarded a franchise, particularly in times when firms are going bust, invoice and get payments regularly;
3. If you are using corporate credit cards or pCards make sure you manage them responsibly;
4. Understand what good processes are, adapt appropriately and adopt them, then consistency stick to them.

In this age of 'transparency' it would be nice to see the full report on Larne Borough Council which is said to also express concerns on the award of contracts. 

Those unaware of the Northern Ireland local government may not realise that there is a restructuring of councils taking place, while there are currently 26 councils, there will soon only be 11. The restructuring provides a wonderful opportunity for procurement transformation, not only strategically but in terms of processes - it provides an opportunity for NI to become an exemplar. But if you want to get the processes right, it makes sense to understand the lessons from past failures - that can't happen when reports for investigations remain hidden. Let's hope that the Larne 'hidden' report is the last we hear of inferior local government procurement performance - what are the odds? 

PSNI dysfunctional procurement strategy: A case study or 'who done it' mystery?

Two years ago I discussed the PSNI's procurement of temporary staff, many of whom had just retired from jobs in the same organisation. This week the Northern Ireland Assembly's PAC published its inquiry report - ten recommendations of which seven relate to procurement. The 'case' should be of interest to all those organisations which make use of Agency staff. 

Those with an interest in procurement strategy as opposed to public policy could look at the Inquiry slightly differently. Is this one of the few situations where there is evidence of a procurement approach actually working in opposition to the intended outcome of the legislation? Cynically, was a procurement approach requested which would satisfy the PSNI's (Police Service of Northern Ireland) objective of 'getting round' the need for changing the personnel? Put slightly differently, was this an 'intended strategy' to match objectives set for procurement or an example of poor procurement?

First, some background. The transformation of the make-up of the police was one of the core commitments of the Good Friday (Northern Ireland Peace) Agreement. Basically there was a desire to have a smaller police service (a peace dividend) and more balance in the mix of Protestant/Roman Catholic police officers. Former RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary - the old police service) officers were given the option of early retirement while a parallel recruitment campaign was put in place to balance the make-up of the new PSNI ). But the procurement approach resulted in more than 1,000 retired RUC officers, 19% of those who took early retirement, being brought back as agency workers to the new PSNI. £106m was spent between 2004 and 2012 on these Agency staff who had just left the RUC. Had those offices been reemployed directly by PSNI they would have had to repay their severance lump sum, which was not the case if they were hired as Agency staff.

Yet again, there was a lack of competitive tendering (you may also find Peter Smith's post today on a similar issue at MOD of interest). The service delivery commenced in 2002 but the competitive tendering was only in 2008. There had been a legacy contract in place for permanent staff which had a throughput of £2m per year, but a variation on that contract to include 'temps' led to a spend of £44m over four years.

Are 21 Crown Representatives an indictment or a solution?

The 4 March announcement of an additional six Crown Representatives means the UK government are relying on a cohort of 21 part-timers to address, what the Financial Times refers to as, Whitehall's "insufficient civil servants with the commercial skills to [manage outsourcing contracts]".

Now let's be clear, outsourcing is not remotely new and there has been major outsourcing in the public sector for many years, but the most recent trend probably dates back to CCT of the 80s. So, let's  say the UK public sector has 25 years of outsourcing yet are not perceived to have developed sufficient skills! How can that be?

Right at the core of Gateway Reviews, PRINCE2 and MSP methodologies are questions relating to whether the client has the skills in place to effectively deliver the project/programme. So how on earth did so many of these 'problem' projects navigate the QA' system without demonstration of the required skills? Is this indicative of a deficiency in the systems as well as the people?

Bill Crothers, the Chief Procurement Officer, justifies the Crown Representatives by saying:

Our Crown Representatives are bringing in top business acumen into Whitehall - our procurement reforms saved £3.8 billion last year and we want to go even further.

The problem is that we just can't differentiate between the savings which are directly attributable to Crown Representatives and those which are attributable to the cohort of commercial senior civil servants. Having said that, I'm sure there are some senior civil servants going through the appraisal system at the present time, claiming that much of the savings the CPO cites are solely attributable to them.

FoI for public sector contractors?

I have to say I was surprised today to hear of proposals that the Freedom of Information Act could be extended to embrace public sector contractors (quite possibility driven by a recommendation from the Social Enterprise UK ) .

I don't actually believe the rhetoric that such a move will force firms to compromise commercial secrets as, it strikes me, Section 43 of the Act already provides that protection. However, I do question how well thought through this potential policy is and what is likely to be the outcome?

Common sense suggests that since the Freedom of Information Act is now well embedded in the public sector it shouldn't be too hard to establish the potential value which would be delivered through the increased scope. For example, it would be useful to know how much cost has been added to the average public sector organisation answering FoI requests? It would also be comparatively easy to carry out some research with those who have made FoI requests to establish the real benefit gained? I have never actually made a FoI request but have had experience in responding. Responding to FoI requests consumes an enormous amount of time and there is a game of sanitisation taking place - a cottage industry has been created for bureaucrats. But equally many requests are just lazy, disguised market research at the expense of the public sector, it's information which isn't in the public interest but the costs are being shifted from the private sector to the public sector. Labour could place a FoI to get that information before pursuing the policy.

If the legislation is extended there will be an additional cost to private and third sector organisations just because they happen to be public sector contractors. There will then have to be some disaggregation of those organisation's work which is covered by FoI requests and which isn't. Those organisations being asked to respond to potential FoI requests will have to allow for that cost in their bids and that in turn will be passed to the public purse - those advocating the policy will need to budget for those costs. It may also be worth considering what the likely impact will be on mirco, small and medium enterprises?

However, if the issue is that the public sector isn't really on top of its contractors, then changes to specifications and contract  management may be more cost effective options.

Some months ago I discussed another Labour proposal, that of obliging all public sector contractors to pay the Living Wage. It strikes me that Labour can see public procurement is a useful political tool but I think it may be better to sit down with some sympathetic businesses and work out the most effective means as opposed to kite-flying.

'Free' in schools shouldn't be free of controls

A few weeks ago I discussed the allegations made in the press about al-Madinah free school - I questioned whether some of the allegations were justified. The allegations included conflicts of interest and lack of processes.

Then this week I discussed the increases in fraud and particularly in procurement. Tonight, we see a convergence of free schools and fraud. Fabricated invoices and money spent without supporting documentation. The latest allegations date back two years (apparently suppressed).

To me these problems all relate to Start-up and possibly naivety. There needs to be more attention given to getting procurement policies, processes and procedures in place together with the appropriate controls at Start-up. But perhaps it is unreasonable to assume that those who are setting up free schools will have the clarity of vision and even know-how to develop and put in place appropriate procurement policies, processes and procedures - that's why we seem to hear of problems after the event.

Now having said that, while Free Schools are the focus at the present, the same problems are surely just around the corner with Clinical Commissioning Groups.

Part of the solution lies in providing a really good start-up toolkit, training and support. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it doesn't look as if that support has/is being provided - if that's the case, it is a false economy and poor risk management.

Freedom may be a good thing but there needs to be protection against chaos. Sometimes even the free need to be protected from the pitfalls.

The Justice of paying tag in procurement

If yesterday’s Sunday Times is correct it appears G4S will have an up hill struggle in gaining future public sector business -  is that justice and would it stand up under public procurement regulations?

Now don’t get me wrong, I have not been afraid to cast stones at G4S and some aspects of their performance, but is this latest concern about tagging the right one to pick a fight about and would justice be seen to be done? Would the demise of G4S be something any government would want to celebrate?

While it may be fashionable to rake up the past of G4S’ Olympics security debacle, who was actually the client for that contract? I can’t see any connection with the MoJ, nor can I believe that MoJ have had full view of all the relevant facts and agreements. That being the case, is it justice to use that as a basis for withholding other contracts? Equally, why act now, given that there were calls for G4S to be blacklisted at the time?

But let’s consider the specifics of the tagging contract. G4S claim they had previously provided information to MoJ auditors for scrutiny, yet have not received any feedback. Given that there’s always a cost in providing information and no feedback has been received which could have helped G4S address issues - is it fair and reasonable to treat a refusal of G4S to volunteer to submit to a forensic audit? Should the evidence of abuse not be presented by the MoJ?

"Generally the MoJ is seen as doing good work in the procurement area"?

I'm going to leave it to others to dissect the G4S and Serco overcharging for tagging the Ministry of Justice. I fully expect a deluge of blogs. Nor do I intend to catalogue the long list of MoJ procurement issues which I have discussed previously.

But I will remind you that last September I highlighted the need to question the value for money of tagging and indeed the need to question the procurement approach including the failure to focus on outcomes.

I also want to remind you that I questioned the value of evidence given to the PASC Procurement Inquiry when one of the 'experts'' stated "Generally the MoJ in seen as doing good work in the procurement area".

The big issue to me is the decision of the Lord Chancellor to launch and internal investigation into contract management based on evidence that MoJ officials knew as far back as 2008 that there were issues with billing. If that proves to be true our profession has been discredited.

I want to learn of the evidence that was uncovered and why that wasn't reported? I want to know how broad, deep and high the awareness went? I want to know whether fraud was involved or corruption? I want to know how much money this has cost the tax payer? I want to know what will happen to tagging if there are only two providers and both are found at fault? I want to understand how these organisations have become so powerful suppliers to the public sector that it appears a blind eye is turned to past misdemeanours? I have long called for personal accountability, will we see that?

Prior to the separation of the MoJ from the Home Office, the then Home Secretary claimed the Home Office "wasn't fit for purpose" - I think we now need to understand what the MoJ Procurement Capability Reviews revealed (written and unwritten - think CQC) and how much of public procurement just isn't fit for purpose?