The risk of unshared service at Whitehall

Few will be surprised at the failure of the Whitehall Shared Service, set up in 2013, to deliver its anticipated savings.  I remember when first being asked to give a view on the tender document saying the major risk would be getting sufficient buy-in from the departments to deliver the benefits.  Sure enough, only two departments have now adopted the 'shared service', four others having dropped out along the way.  You can read the NAO report but, to me, for the initiative to be a success there needed to be leadership, risk management, change management, technical capability of the provider and programme management.  I'm sure the Major Projects regime will have its own view - let's face it the MPA must have to provide some accountability for delivery.

1. Leadership: who was/is leading this initiative providing a compelling agrument to ensure and the potential user departments stay the journey?
2. Risk management: How were the risks accessed and managed, particuluarly the risk of failing to deliver the business case, failure to have sufficient confidence in the new solution to shift from the old systems, failure to gain ownership of the departments, and more, to grow the number of users, failure to ensure the provider will sufficient income to 'stay the distance'?
3. Change management: I fear that like so many of these projects the emphasis will have been on the technical solution and as a result the 'people aspects' will have been sidelined - these initiatives are never just a technical solution, there will be people who need to want to shift to the new ways of working.
4. Does it work: Of course the technology has to do  what it is supposed to better than the 'old ways' but it also has to remain current and reflect the speed to innovation in technology.

Now those politically and managerially responsible need to have a response plan. Can they learn the lessons, salvage the relationships with those who have 'dropped out' and still make the investment deliver its projected benefits?  For the rest of us we can only learn.

When news of procurement doom and gloom is a good thing

News that one in four government projects is in danger of failing may surprise you as something I view as worth celebrating.

It is a good thing that if it represents an honesty in project management status. It is a good thing if represents a true assessment of risk. It is a good thing if it avoids throwing further good money after bad. It is a good thing if it leads to corrective action being taken. It is a good thing if lessons are learnt and shared.

It is a good thing if other organisations learn that honesty in project management risk is something to be valued.

However, should the projects continue 'As Is' it represents a terrible waste of opportunity and a sad inditment on strategic procurement and project management.

Procurement policy, hubris and the cloak of invisibility.

I suspect this week is not the best time to discuss the Christmas Party at CCS given the press attention to IT procurement. Saturday had an excellent feature in Times2 on why government IT projects go wrong, then today's Times had four separate pieces on the Aspire Debacle, for example: here.

To me the big issue isn't yet another IT procurement debacle, it's the issues of procurement policy, hubris and invisibility . 

The political leader of UK government procurement, also famous for his Jerrycan approach to 'bottleneck purchases', is Francis Maude, the Cabinet Office minister. Earlier this year he decreed that IT procurement policy was that there would be no contracts over £100m - small was considered beautiful regardless of the risks!

Now in spite of a long history of not implementing procurement policy, it seems this 'small is good policy' is going to break the mold and actually be implemented by splitting the major HMRC Aspire project into smaller contracts. I need not join the chorus of those who argue this is high risk, but included in that chorus are some notable voices from the CBI, Public Accounts Committee and Public Administration Select Committee.

A Cabinet Office spokesperson is reported to have said though "HMRC intends to break this contract into packages which is entirely in line with our new approach and will ensure competition from the widest possible  range of suppliers". There is no admission that this may be a demonstration of procurement hubris or even stupid sourcing, just that it is in line with policy. Nor was there any confirmation that discussions with the market have provided confirmation that SMEs will indeed be willing and able to bid! 

Nevertheless, since it's in line with policy, it must be okay? What we have not heard is the voice of the Government's CPO providing an endorsement for the procurement approach. Does he agree with it in this particular case? Does he disagree with it but can't publicly say that? Does he believe that in spite of the accepted positioning of such an IT procurement as 'strategic' within a Krajic model, he has a better recommended strategy which the rest of the 'procurement pack' have yet to see? Then again, what about the Major Projects Authority - haven't they a role in disaster avoidance or do disaggregated contracts of less than £100m avoid their radar?

There's another interesting quote from an HMRC spokesman: "We will renew our IT contract within Cabinet Office guidelines and on time."  Is that a buck passing statement to the effect that if it all goes wrong the HMRC only followed Cabinet Office guidelines? The pedants among you will of course have noticed that the only commitment is to delivery of the 'IT contract ... on time' which does not necessarily mean the actual functional delivery of the service being procured. Isn't it wonderful that the project is called Aspire!