TAC and the choice of fighter jets

We all know the theory of calculating Total Acquisition Costs but anyone in the real world also knows that when you get down to practice predicting future costs is a bit harder than the theory.

The latest saga in the fighter jet and aircraft carrier saga provides a good case study. Rather than the preferred option being 25% lower,  MOD are now faced with the cost of justifying an increased upfront cost of £1.8bn, as opposed to the previously predicted £400m.  That's quite a difference and I'm sure many of you ask, 'How could your calculations be so far out?'  Getting the predicted figures wrong is understandable but making the wrong choice somewhat harder to justify.

If you were asked to calculate TAC for a fighter jet you may well have done a comparison of the alternatives and really looked at running costs, maintenance costs, etc., but would you have included the additional costs of

Fighting about Indian defence procurement

The world is certainly richer for discussions on Indian defence procurement.  Recently I tweeted a bizarre report from the BBC on significant delays to Indian defence procurement which were likely be the outcome of an unsuccessful challenge over the age of one of the generals.  Separately I questioned how the Eurofighter consortium, of which the UK is a part, could be readmitted to the bidding.

By way of an update, the UK are part of a consortium bidding to build 127 fighter jets.  The bid is worth £7-10bn (reports vary) and if the UK bid isn't successful a thousands of jobs are at stake.  At the start of the month it was reported that the French (Rafale) were the preferred bidder and the UK bid would progress no further.  Cameron wasn't happy, claiming that the Eurofighter bid was lowest, it was unfair that we were out.  Cameron planned to do all in his power to get the Eurofighter bid readmitted to the competition.  I questioned how that could happen and the potential political and procurement implications of the readmission.

Yesterday, it was reported that all is not well with the Indian negotiating team. It appears that two of the senior officials have now gone public stating

Wiggle room for revisiting public procurement decisions

How much wiggle room is there in public procurement processes?  I was fairly sure that I could have mapped out the key steps of a public procurement process – particularly when you reach one-way valves in the system which prohibit a return.  However, I admitted a few weeks ago I couldn’t grasp how the MoJ had been able to add a home bid into a previously agreed shortlist. 

Today I’m also asking myself, how could that happen?  This time the UK are convinced that they have scope to regain entry, after being excluded, to the bidding process for the Indian government’s procurement of £10bn worth of fighter jets.   France are the now the ‘last man standing’ in the procurement negotiations.

What could possibly have gone wrong that the UK bid isn’t through to the final stage? Although we have yet to hear what the debriefing will reveal, included in the suggestions is